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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming more integrated in our daily life with the increasing
number of embedded electronic devices interacting together. These electronic devices are
often controlled by a Micro-Controller Unit (MCU). As an example, it is estimated that
today’s well-equipped automobile uses more than 50 MCUs. Some MCUs contain cryp-
tographic co-processors to enhance the security of the exchanged and stored data with a
common belief that the data is secured and safe. However many MCUs have been shown
to be vulnerable to Fault Injection (FI) attacks. These attacks can reveal shared secrets,
firmware, and other confidential information. In addition, this extracted information ob-
tained by attacks can lead to identification of new vulnerabilities which may scale to attacks
on many devices. In general, FI on MCUs corrupt data or corrupt instructions. Although
it is assumed that only authorized personnel with access to cryptographic secrets will gain
access to confidential information in MCUs, attackers in specialized labs nowadays may
have access to high-tech equipment which could be used to attack these MCUs. Laser Fault
Injection (LFI) is gaining more of a reputation for its ability to inject local faults rather
than global ones due to its precision, thus providing a greater risk of breaking security in
many devices.
Although publications have generally discussed the topic of security of MCUs, attack
techniques are diverse and published LFI provides few and superficial details about the
used experimental setup and methodology. Furthermore, limited research has examined
the combination of both LFI and Photo-Emission Microscopy (PEM), direct modification
of instructions using the LFI, control of embedded processor resets using LFI, and counter-
measures which simultaneously thwart other aspects including decapsulation and reverse
engineering (RE).
This thesis contributes to the study of the MCUs’ security by analyzing their suscep-
tibility to LFI attacks and PEM. The proposed research aims to build a LFI bench from
scratch allowing maximum control of laser parameters. In addition, a methodology for
analysis of the Device Under Attack (DUA) in preparation for LFI is proposed, including
frontside/backside decapsulation methods, and visualization of the structure of the DUA.
Analysis of attack viability of different targets on the DUA, including One-Time Pro-
grammable (OTP) memory, Flash memory and Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)
was performed. A realistic attack of a cryptographic algorithm, such as Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) using LFI was conducted. On the other hand, countermeasures to the
proposed attack techniques, including decapsulation/RE, LFI and PEM, were discussed.
This dissertation provides a summary for the necessary background and experimental setup
to study the possibility of LFI and PEM in different DUAs of two different technologies,
iv
specifically PIC16F687 and ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Attacks performed on
on-chip peripherals such as Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and
debug circuity reveal new vulnerabilities. This research is important for understanding
attacks in order to design countermeasures for securing future hardware.
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The wide integration of embedded devices into almost every aspect in our lives is forc-
ing manufacturers of these devices to design secure products. Contactless credit cards,
e-passports, automobiles, etc., are just few examples of the everyday “ things” that have
embedded electronics built inside. Ensuring the security of such devices is of crucial im-
portance, especially with different types of known popular attacks which can exploit any
ignored security gaps to conduct a security breach. For example, various security threats
and protection mechanisms in the automotive industry are mentioned in [15]. The imple-
mentation of cryptographic algorithms could be attacked on known side channels [16], for
example analyzing the device’s power which unintentionally leaks secret information dur-
ing the execution of the security algorithm. Injecting faults in electronic circuits through
Electro-Magnetic (EM) waves or laser for example as in [17] and [18] may also leak secret
information and thus demands higher levels of physical security. Also, reverse engineering
(RE) [19], which is defined as the processes of extracting knowledge or design informa-
tion from anything man-made and reproducing it or reproducing anything based on the
extracted information, is a known methodology in de-assembling electronic circuits. For
example, RE may leak details on contents of secure memories or security implementations.
It’s worth noting that it’s highly likely any embedded system may be reverse engineered
with variation in the time consumed, expenses incurred and expertise required to do so.
The security measures taken while designing each system determine the costs required
for RE that system. Also, advancement in technology leading to reduced size of on-chip
transistors and increased device complexity are challenges facing RE. Different classifi-
cations have been proposed for the types of the RE processes that can be followed [20].
Some classifications are based on the chip type; for example, as shown in Figure 1.1,
Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) re-
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quire structural RE, smart cards and MCUs need both structural and program-code RE
while structural and bit-stream RE are used to deal with complex programmable logic
devices (CPLDs) and FPGAs. Structural RE [20] means extracting all the information
about the internal structure of a chip such as locations of transistors and interconnections
in-between. This process is very tedious, time-consuming and requires a certain level of ex-
perience. Program-code RE targets retrieving the memory contents to understand how the
device works. Bit-stream RE is based on converting the acquired bit-stream to logic gates
and equations that describe the functionality. Companies like TechInsights [21] provide














Figure 1.1: RE based on chip type.
RE is becoming a niche area for business since it can be used as a very strong aiding
factor to reduce time-to-market because RE basically serves as a method to understand
the function of a certain system and provides the ability to replicate a similar or better
one.
1.1 Motivation
Many modern electronic devices such as computers, cell phones, smart cards and Electronic
Control Units (ECUs) in automobiles have sensitive information stored inside which may
need to be communicated securely. That need makes security a serious design concern for
those devices. A lot of advancement in the field of encryption has been made. On the other
hand, confidential information which can be encrypted securely using software algorithms
could be easily bypassed through hardware attacks, for example like bit or row hammering
[23, 24]. Physical access to the chip under attack increases the probability of breaking
the security of an embedded system instead of trying to hack the chip remotely. Side
channel analysis through EM emanations and power measurements could reveal important
information about cryptographic activities inside the DUA. EM fault injection is another
2
technique used to introduce global faults inside the DUA. Also, voltage variations and clock
glitching could alter the normal behavior of the running DUA and lead to unauthorized
access to confidential data.
During the beginning of this century, LFI was introduced as an accurate method for
injecting local faults inside the DUA. Being more precise in injecting faults increases the
ability of extracting secret data from inside the DUA. LFI requires the attacker to have
access to the frontside and/or the backside of the chip. So LFI needs the packaged chip
to become decapsulated. Mechanical milling, drilling, polishing and chemical etching are
possible ways to have a decapsulated chip. The process of decapsulating the chip from
the frontside/backside then identifying different structures under a microscope is called
structural RE. Full RE by removing one layer after the other using suitable chemicals and
imaging each layer before removal isn’t needed when LFI will be used to introduce faults
in the DUA. Large structures like SRAM and flash EEPROM (memories in general) are
easily identifiable once you put the DUA under a microscope unit. LFI could then be used
in theory to target bytes down to a single bit depending on different parameters such as
the laser beam spot size, energy and duration of exposure of the DUA to the laser.
1.2 Objectives
This thesis has objectives that range from IC preparation, through to laser fault injection
equipment setup and to laser fault injection analysis. The objective of analyzing the laser
fault injection results is to better understand how to design countermeasures and thus cre-
ate more secure embedded systems. This thesis aims to reveal the details of building a low
cost LFI setup as well as a low cost methodology for both frontside/backside decapsulation.
Also, this research analyzes various LFI attacks on two DUAs with different technology
nodes, processor cores and design complexities. Combining static PEM emissions with LFI
to provide fine tuning of faulty instructions in addition to reverse engineering the target
clock cycle for successful LFI is another goal of this study; thus having a more controlled
instruction replacement environment. This thesis intends to provide a practical setup to
monitor the active laser pulse and laser induced current. This research tries to investigate
real-life attacks such as an attack on AES encryption algorithm to reveal the secret key,




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents an introduction to the theory behind the laser operation and how
it can be used to inject faults in ICs.
Chapter 3 offers a review for the published literature with respect to the conducted
attacks, proposed countermeasures, equipment, targeted devices and the followed method-
ology starting from sample preparation for FI to successful FI.
Chapter 4 describes the proposed research methodology and the assembled setup for
both LFI and PEM. Also this chapter demonstrates the custom-designed circuitry for
triggering the LFI for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 and gives a brief overview of
the DUAs attacked during this research.
Chapter 5 lists the results achieved through applying the proposed methodology at dif-
ferent stages of the LFI process on the embedded MCU PIC16F687. Different attacks were
conducted on PIC16F687 such as instruction skip/replacement, skipping configuration bits
programming and retrieving the AES-128 key. In addition, PEM analysis was performed
to read out the decoded instructions coming out of the flash memory.
Chapter 6 capitalizes on the knowledge acquired from attacking the PIC1F687 and ap-
plies it on a more complex MCU which is the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Struc-
tures other than memories were identified such as UART and debug circuitry. Instruction
manipulation was also investigated.
Chapter 7 summarizes what has been achieved, lists the contributions to the state-of-
the-art research, points out the limitations the assembled LFI and PEM setups. Possible




Let’s begin by differentiating between a defect, fault and error. A defect is usually caused
during the manufacturing process or through aging (i.e. physical) while a fault is caused
through electrical manifestation. Therefore, an error could be defined as the manifestation
of a fault [25, 26]. In the following section, a brief overview of different classes of fault
injection attacks is given, then the sections to follow will focus on LFI.
2.1 Types of Attacks
Attacks can be categorized with respect to different metrics. According to [27], attacks
could be classified into three main categories described next, specifically non-invasive,
invasive, and semi-invasive.
2.1.1 Non-invasive
In these types of attacks the package of the chip is left unaltered and the chip is attacked
while in operation. Examples of such types of attacks are mentioned below:
• Voltage glitching:
Under-voltage and over-voltage attacks can disable or bypass protection circuits or
even force incorrect execution of instructions by a processor. Therefore, some security
processors have detection mechanisms for voltage variations.
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• Clock glitching:
Circuits that detect variation in voltage usually can’t react to fast transients, so clock
transients can be used to affect the decode and execution stages in some processors.
• Side channel analysis:
Power, EM, or other measurements and analysis can lead to detecting different ac-
tivities performed by a processor and hence attacking the target processor at specific
locations during those activities. For example, SRAM write operations often generate
strong signals when changing a single bit from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or vice versa.
• Test interface:
Some MCUs and smart cards have a factory-test interface that provides access to
on-chip memory and allows the manufacturer to test those devices. Normally, in-
formation on those test circuits is kept secret by the manufacturer, but the attacker
can exploit different voltage levels to put the chip into test mode. Such circuits are
usually destroyed in smart cards by the manufacturer after testing and before ship-
ping the chips. Attacks, which exploit the testing interface in MCUs, usually have
to bypass some sort of authentication in order to allow downloading from internal
memory for example.
2.1.2 Invasive
These types of attacks start with the removal of the chip package. Once the die is exposed,
direct contact or interface to circuit are possible. Also, altering the circuit directly through
bulk silicon or metallization layers are other options. Examples of such types of attacks
are mentioned below:
• Microprobing:
Microprobing is a very important tool in both failure analysis and RE of chips [27].
Smaller feature size, multi-level metallization and polysilicon make microprobing
more challenging. To establish probe contact, laser-cutting system and Focused Ion
Beam (FIB) workstation are used for less sophisticated technology nodes and more
sophisticated technologies less than 0.5µm, respectively. A laser cutting system can
be used to make precise cuts in the passivation layer for the sake of microprob-
ing without short circuits. After establishing probe contact via the removal of the
passivation layer, microprobing can be used for system-level functional analysis to
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understand the operation through injecting stimulus and observing reactions. More-
over, microprobing can be used for eavesdropping on on-chip signals and extraction
of secret keys and memory contents. In [28], a technique is proposed to maintain the
keys in the execution unit instead of a memory element to resist probing attacks of
internal bus and memory locations. In addition, the vibrations of the probing needle
can be used to remove the passivation layer for old technology nodes. A proper setup
for a microprobing station will have a stable stage to hold a microscope (with 3 to
4 objective lens if it’s optical), a device test socket connected to a computer, micro-
manipulators (basically micro-positioners with sub-micron resolution steps), and 6
to 8 probe tips which may be active for probing unbuffered internal signals or passive
for eavesdropping, injecting signals and probing buffered signals.
• Short-circuiting or opening wires in metalization
In the range of nm/µm, modifying a chip is often referred as performing an IC mi-
crosurgery. It’s usually done after gaining some knowledge about the chip to know
the right point for attacking. The tools used for chip modification are microprobe tip
for less sophisticated attacks and larger technology nodes, FIB workstation for more
sophisticated attacks, or laser-cutting. A microsurgery might be performed to mod-
ify, bypass or disable hardware locks either by cutting internal wires or completely
destroying the module. For example, FIB can be used for establishing probe contact
through probe (or test) point creation, imaging (down to 5nm resolution [28]), re-
pairing and milling holes. In the laser-cutting system, the Near Ultraviolet (NUV)
can be used to remove the passivation layer then green laser to cut the metal wires
and NIR to cut through the top metal layer to access wires in the second metal layer.
2.1.3 Semi-invasive
These types of attacks need to have direct access to the silicon die and the ability to
accurately target individual circuits so the chip package is removed. However, the circuit
remains unaffected. The passivation layer remains the same, so the expensive microprobing
tools aren’t used. Examples of such types of attacks are mentioned below:
• Ultraviolet (UV) light can be used to disable security fuses in EEPROM or clear
configuration bits in MCUs. Modern MCUs are less susceptible to this attack as
they are designed with the UV attack in mind.
• Advanced frontside and backside imaging techniques such as laser scanning, IR and
thermo-imaging can be considered as semi-invasive attacks.
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• A powerful and accurate focused light spot is a simple method to induce alterations
in the behavior of one or more logic gates of a circuit. For obtaining an accurately
focused light beam from a camera flash, the use of a precision microscope is required.
Otherwise, the use of low-quality lenses results in the diffraction of the light beam [18].
In [27, 29], successful targeting of the SRAM cells using this method was reported.
The attack caused a bit-flip on the targeted SRAM cell of a MCU. In [30], by using
a microscope, a modified camera flash and a computer, an effective attack against a
cryptographic algorithm on an 8-bit smart card is reported. The attack was done on
a decapsulated MCU running an embedded AES algorithm. Furthermore, the width
of the gate dielectric in current fabrication technologies is more than 10 times smaller
than the shortest wavelength of visible light. So, theoretically, it is no longer possible
to hit a single SRAM cell on an up-to-date circuit with current etching technology.
• LFI in a decapsulated chip is another way to generate faults. Using a laser beam
allows an opponent to target more precisely a small circuit area. It can be considered
to be the most straightforward refinement of the previous technique [18]. The fault
model is also similar to the previous one with more feasibility of creating faults and
reproducibility.
Compared to non-invasive attacks, semi-invasive attacks are harder to implement as
they require decapsulation of the chip. However, significantly less expensive equipment is
needed than for invasive attacks. Semi-invasive attacks can be performed in a reasonably
short period of time. Also they are scalable to a certain extent, and the skills and knowledge
required to perform them can be easily and quickly acquired. Some of these attacks, such as
an exhaustive search for a security fuse, can be automated. If compared to invasive attacks,
the semi-invasive ones do not normally require precise positioning for success because they
are normally applied to a whole transistor or even a group of transistors rather than
to a single wire inside the chip. Other taxonomies of attacks and their corresponding
countermeasures are presented in [31].
Section 2.2 will briefly discuss some laser-relevant definitions in optics and the theory
behind the practical usage of lasers in injecting faults in ICs [32].
2.2 Laser Theory and Operation
Laser (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) is a stimulated-emission
EM radiation in the visible or the invisible domain. Laser is monochromatic, unidirectional,
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coherent and artificial (i.e. laser does not spontaneously exist in nature). Laser can be
generated as a beam of very small diameter (a few µm). The beam can pass through
various material obstacles before impacting a target during a very short duration.
A laser light can be produced in different wavelengths such as UV (100 ∼ 400nm),
visible colors (400 ∼ 700nm) and NIR (700 ∼ 1400nm) and IR domains (1400nm ∼ 1mm).
2.2.1 Laser beams - Gaussian TEM
The Transverse Electric and Magnetic (TEM) mode means that both the electric field
and the magnetic field (which are always perpendicular to one another in free space) are
transverse (or perpendicular) to the direction of propagation. Different TEM modes are
shown in Figure 2.1. The fundamental mode of TEM of a laser resonator has the same
form as a Gaussian beam. Thus Gaussian beam propagation applies to most lasers, see
Figure 2.3b. The Gaussian beam is unlike light coming from a light bulb or sunlight which
are uniform (or has uniform intensity at any distance z). Furthermore, unlike light coming
from a light bulb or sunlight, the laser wave has predictable phase and amplitude along its
path. The total power is the same at all cross sections of the beam. Gaussian beams do
not diverge linearly as do light beams.
Figure 2.1: TEM modes [1].
For a time-harmonic wave of frequency, Maxwell’s equations in free space are referred
to as the Helmholtz equations, a time-independent form of the wave equation. Using a
paraxial approximation of Helmholtz equations, one can describe the propagation of EM
waves in the form of Gaussian beams. In particular, the paraxial approximation assumes
the variation of the propagation is slow on the scale of wavelength and is slow on the scale
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of transverse extent of the wave. The solution to the Helmholtz equations is complex and
involves Bessel functions, but leads to the important equations 2.1-2.4 in [3,33] describing
the laser beam propagation in free space where w(z) is the distance from the beam axis
where the intensity drops to 1
e2
of its peak of the beam at location z; zR is some constant
to be defined later; wo is the beam waist radius (or the minimum spot size) defined at
z = 0; R(z) is the beam wave front curvature radius at z; φ(z) is the Guoy phase shift ;
and I(r, z) is the beam intensity, in cross sectional plane with radial coordinate r.
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I(r, z) = Io(z)e
−2r2
w(z)2 (2.4)
The parameter zR is the Rayleigh range, where w(zR) = wo
√
2 , from equation 2.1. The
Rayleigh range defines the distance over which the laser’s beam radius spreads by a factor
of square root of 2. It is used as the separation between near field and far field analysis.
The Rayleigh range can be further defined by equation 2.5 [3, 33] which incorporates the
wavelength, λ; index of refraction, n (ratio of velocity of light in free space to velocity
of light in material through which it travels, where n = 1 for air); and M2 parameter
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Figure 2.3: Half angle divergence and Gaussian beams from [3], notice that values of wo
shown in labels in a) should be reversed and Gaussian beam intensity of laboratory laser
in b).








Note that the beam is totally characterized by the wavelength λ, M2 and the beam
waist radius wo or Rayleigh range zR. Near the beam waist, z  zR, (and also at z =∞),
the wave is like a planar wave with no curvature, unlike z  zR or z ∼ zR where there is
curvature.
A Gaussian beam along its direction of propagation develops a phase shift, referred to
as the Guoy phase shift. This is unlike a planar wave with the same optical frequency. For
single wavelength lasers, typically TEM00 is assumed, however other TEM modes (TEMmp
where m, p parameters are dependent upon the Guoy phase shift) may be present in other
applications such as lasers in multimode fiber optic cables. It is interesting to note that
real lasers typically have some higher order modes and do not function exactly as the
theoretical equations predict. In addition, scattering due to surface defects is typically
more of a concern for lasers.
The divergence is a measure of how quickly the laser beam expands far from the beam
waist. If a laser beam has low divergence it is referred to as being collimated. The
divergence is defined by the change in beam diameter divided by the horizontal distance
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over which it travels. Near the laser the divergence angle is extremely small, whereas the
far field divergence is typically measured at 10zR. Typically, far field distance for laser
beams occurs meters from the laser. One can approximate the divergence of the beam
in the far field using the relationship z
zR
 1. Using the far field definition, equation 2.1
becomes equation 2.6 [3, 33]; and equation 2.7 [3, 33] illustrates the half angle divergence





















For example, a 1064nm laser with a 1mm beam radius at beam width and a zR of 3m
in air, has a half angle divergence of approximately 0.33mrads which is 0.019°(multiply by
57°or 1
2π
), thus it can be considered collimated in a lab setup. In comparison the laboratory
laser (CNI) has a calculated half angle divergence of 0.501mrads or 0.028°(using equation
2.7 with M2 = 1.38, n = 1, wo =
1.865
2
mm from technical specifications), thus it is also
assumed collimated.
One can rewrite the divergence as a full angle divergence θ00, denoted by subscript 00,
and utilize the beam waist diameter d00, as shown in equation 2.8 [3,33]. Two laser beams
in Figure 2.3a [3] illustrate different divergences. Note that the larger beam waist has lower







The Neodymium: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) 1064nm laser and CO2 9.2−
10.8µm lasers, continuous wave and pulsed, are widely used for research in semiconductor
effects [34]. In particular, 1.06 and 1.08 µm pulsed lasers have penetration depths of about
700µm with almost uniform ionization of active regions through the depth (important for
backside attacks) unlike non-uniform ionizations of lower wavelengths.
2.2.2 Optics and Laser beam spot size
It is important to note that all light, EM, particle beams, etc., exhibit the effects of
diffraction. Highly focused laser beams used to create a minimum spot size are limited by
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diffraction. The highly focused laser beam will have far field distances from its waist (or
focused spot) of only a few mm’s or less. The diameter of a focused spot, d00, is shown
in equation 2.9 [3,33], located at distance f (focal length) from the (thin) lens with beam
width D00 entering the lens, as shown in Figure 2.4a) where f ≈ D00, the diameter of the








Note that equation 2.9 illustrates that a wider beam D00 can be focused to a smaller
spot size d00, due to lower divergence.
Figure 2.4: Focusing with thin lens to small spot size in a) and triangle of thin lens in b).
For example, consider using a 1064nm laser with beam width D00 = 1.86mm (13.5%
of peak) using Mitutoyo 50X objective (with focal length f = 4mm), the minimum spot





(4mm) = 2.9µm. Now using optics
to expand the beam by 2 times1 before focusing it into a small spot, the calculation of
spot size produces a smaller spot size of 2.9
2
= 1.45µm. In addition, the beam width at
the output of the beam expander must be less than the aperture of the focusing lens and
alignment is important.
Equation 2.9 can be further illustrated using fiber coupling example. In order to couple
a laser into a fiber, typically the beam is expanded with one lens (called a beam expander)
1Beam expander which can be screwed into laboratory laser head can be found at http://www.master-
laser.cn/YAG%201064%20Beam%20Expander.html for 1064nm Nd:YAG lasers.
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and then focused with a second in order to obtain a very small spot size equal to the
fiber core diameter. The beam expander increases the beam width, D00, so that it may be
focused to a smaller spot size, d00. Typically, this fiber coupler or fiber port is also often
referred to as an up-collimator [35]. Additionally, it is critical for high energy pulses that
the small spot size is exactly aligned into the fiber otherwise the result may be catastrophic
(meaning the fiber may be destroyed). Alignment is usually performed with several mirrors
and a pyroelectric sensor which measures laser energy. Typically, single wavelength lasers
with fundamental TEM modes would utilize a single mode optical fiber cable (not multi-
mode) in which case there is less loss of energy. Generally if the fiber has a core diameter
more than the wavelength, there is the possibility of internal reflections causing a range of
beam angles and velocities and thus causing multi-mode behavior (TEMm,p), which has
less peak power and wider beam diameter exiting the fiber. There is also a critical angle
requirement which the entering laser beam must meet, otherwise there will be significant
loss of energy or catastrophic results.
In microscopy applications, the f number, f#, is more frequently referred to rather
than divergence. It’s defined here by the input beam diameter in equation 2.10 [33] and










f# = 1.27λf# (2.11)
Numerical Aperture (NA) is another term frequently used for microscopy, light and
imaging applications. It is defined in equation 2.12 as the acceptance angle of the objective,
also indicating the resolving power of the lens. Angle θ is shown in Figure 2.4b). The NA
may also be used to refer to lasers where if θ is the full angle, then the NA for 1
e
drop is
n sin θ. The spot size can also be formulated using NA. The Rayleigh (most commonly
used), Abbe and Sparrow criterion are shown in equations 2.13 [36] respectively, for a
circular aperture uniformly illuminated (light), producing an Airy disk (due to diffraction)
with diameter d00 . For NA = 1, which is typical for air, the spot size is approximately
equal to the wavelength. In modern optics typically NA = 1.4, hence the spot size is
roughly proportional to half of wavelength. Since lasers are Gaussian and not uniform, the
equations in 2.13 do not apply. By substituting the NA approximation of equation 2.12 [37]




better. Note also that Depth of Field (DOF) in equation 2.14 [37], is proportional to the
inverse of NA squared.
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In general lasers focused to small spots will spread out quickly as it moves away from
the focus. In contrast, wider laser beams stay roughly the same size over long distances.
Recent research has identified that significantly smaller spot sizes, are possible at regions
within nm’s away from the beam waist, such as [38].
An objective is typically preferred over a lens since it has less spherical aberration.
Chromatic aberrations, where the focal length depends on the index of refraction which
varies as a function of wavelength, are typically not an issue for single wavelength lasers.
Achromatic or apochromatic lenses are corrected to bring more than one wavelength to
focus at the same spot. Often the focal length for an objective is quoted for a specific
wavelength. However the lens maker’s equation, defined in equation 2.15 [39] (where r1
and r2 define the positive value of radius of curvature of each face of a converging thin
lens), illustrates that the focal length is inversely proportional to the index of refraction
minus 1.
For example, the Mitutoyo 5X objective has a specified focal length of 40mm for a
wavelength of 500nm (Mitutoyo). Using the indexes of refraction of 2.34 and 2.23 for
500nm and 1064nm wavelengths respectively from the graph 6.6 in [40], one can correct
this focal length for 1064nm wavelength. Thus the focal length of 40mm specified for a








Similarly, in the previous example, the spot sizes of 2.9µm/1.45µm would be corrected to
3.12µm/1.56µm using the 50X objective with depth of fields 14.2µm/3.5µm, respectively.
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2.2.3 Laser absorption and fault mechanisms
Whereas the laser beam and spot size equations utilize wave theory, the laser absorption
into materials typically uses the quantum aspect where the particles are referred to as
photons. Photons of the laser beam just inside the surface of the medium will couple to
electronic or vibrational states depending on the energy of the photon. Photons absorbed
into the medium, have energies near or greater than the medium’s bandgap. The absorp-
tion refers to electronic coupling of the photon (or excited electronic states), specifically in
semiconductors, the transition of electrons from valence to conduction bands (creation of
electron-hole pairs) or within bands (inter-sub-band transitions). These electronic excited
states may also then transfer energy to lattice phonons and thermalize within the medium.
If the excitation rate is low compared to the thermalization rate, one may consider the
absorbed laser energy being directly transformed into heat. If the photon energy is signif-
icantly less than the bandgap, no absorption will take place unless there are impurity or
defect states to couple to [41]. The electron-hole pairs generated by absorbed photons will
drift to create a transient current. This transient current changes the characteristics of the
silicon structures, specifically delays, thus possibly causing faults to be injected. Typically
pulsed lasers (on the order of ns pulses) are referred to as transient response (or dose-rate
effects). Alternatively, if the duration of the laser irradiation is in the order of microsec-
onds, e.g. using continuous wave (cw) lasers, lattice vibrations may dominate (equivalently
absorption and creation of phonons) causing the silicon to heat. The impact of the heat
is to reduce the bandgap energy and thus facilitate fault injection. Once the irradiation
has ceased, the medium rapidly returns to equilibrium due to the carrier recombination
rate (decreasing carrier densities) and high mobility. Each of these processes is discussed
in more detail in this sub-section.
When the laser beam hits the silicon, reflection and absorption occurs. The reflection
is caused by the discontinuity in the index of refraction (from air to silicon). The percent
of power of the beam reflected is proportional to the reflectivity. The reflection depends on
the index of refraction of the material, incident angle of beam and the beam’s polarization.
Generally for silicon (with wavelength around 1000nm) it’s typically 30% [41] or 41% [42].
It’s important to note that after the beam enters the silicon it may travel through to
the silicon substrate and be transmitted out of the opposite side of the silicon die (e.g.
42%− 12% transmittance for die thicknesses 20− 260µm [42]). A metallic reflective plate
on the other side of the silicon can be used to reflect back energy into the substrate [43]. For
example, backside irradiation may use a metallic reflective plate on frontside of silicon die
and vice versa. Typically, some energy is also naturally reflected from the back surface of
the silicon substrate due to the discontinuity of the refractive index. For example, thinning
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of the backside of an IC can typically reduce thickness from 790µm to 30µm [44]. For a
362µm thick IC, the frontside includes 15µm metal layers (6 layers), 2µm active devices,
30µm FIB trenches and 315µm bulk silicon material [45].
Although some mechanisms of semiconductors can be characterized using linear rela-
tionships at low energies (up to 105−106 W
cm2
or equivalent dose rates up to 1012rad(Si)s−1)
and non-linear relationships at extremely high energies, the actual mechanisms are very
complex and are affected by impurities, defects, circuit structures within the material, etc.
Linear relationships will be covered next.
If the laser beam’s energy is greater than the silicon’s bandgap energy Eg, then each
absorbed photon produces a single electron-hole pair, referred to as the photoelectric effect
(e.g. liberates an electron). The photoelectric effect is energy and medium dependent. The
silicon bandgap energy at room temperature is 1.12eV . Lasers with 1064nm wavelength
have energy just higher than the silicon band gap. For example, the energy of the liberated
electron is Ee = hv−Eg. If the photon’s energy is 3 to 4 times greater than the bandgap,
the energy absorbed (or ionization energy, Ei) generally does not increase significantly,
creating a threshold like effect. Specifically its value is shown in equation 2.16 [43].
Ei = 2.67Ee + 0.87 eV (2.16)
Also it’s interesting to note that also at extremely high energy levels two other processes
can occur, specifically Compton scattering (liberates an electron but also gives off a wave of
a different wavelength) and pair production (produces an electron and a positron, requiring
MeV s of energy). These mechanisms are typically important to radiation simulation using
lasers. All three mechanisms are referred to as ionization. Lasers with less than 10mW
are insufficient to switch bits in memory but may change the gate switching time [46]. The
corresponding penetration depth is about 700µm for neodymium lasers emitting at 1.06 or
1.08µm [43].
The absorption of the laser beam into the medium generally follows Beer-Lambert
law [34]. Another more detailed formulation which incorporates time is shown in equation
2.17, and denoted as the depth profile of equivalent dose rate [43], where R is the reflection
coefficient, Iin is the incident intensity, go is the electron-hole generation constant (4.3 ×







The absorption coefficient strongly depends upon the wavelength but also depends
upon the temperature, type/level of doping and laser energy [43]. For example, doping
concentrations higher than 1018cm−3, as typical in bulk and at the surface, lead to higher
ionization.
Higher absorption occurs at higher temperatures due to reduction of the bandgap,
however other effects may take place including latchup, resistivity, etc. If the laser energy
exceeds the bandgap energy, the absorption coefficient, α, is defined in equation 2.18 [43],
where αf refers to fundamental absorption coefficient; σn, σp refer to the light scattering
cross sections of free electrons and holes; the parameters Nn and Np are the equilibrium
free densities of free electrons and holes; and NFC is the total density of generated and
injected electron-hole pairs.
αt(z, t) = αf + σnNn + σpNp + (σn + σp)NFC(z, t) (2.18)
Parameters σn, σp vary as λy where y is between 2 and 3.5 depending upon the semi-
conductor [43]. The energy bandgap decreases as the doping concentration increases and
this also raises the absorption coefficient (referred to as the Burstein-Moss shift).
It’s well known that the bandgap energy of silicon reduces as the temperature rises. The
reduction in bandgap leads to a laser absorption coefficient dependence shift. Experimental
evidence has shown that this effect is stronger for wavelengths around 1.06µm where the
charge tripled (although the theory predicted charge to double) [47]. In this experiment a
pulsed laser, spot size 5µm (8ps pulse width) was focused on the frontside of a pn-junction
in 2µm CMOS and found to increase the charge over temperatures 22℃-110℃.
The spatial generation profile of electron-holes in silicon follows the laser profile which
is a Gaussian distribution in this case represented in equation 2.19 [46] where η is photo-
generation efficiency. This is similar to the intensity equation 2.4 and simulated model of
laser current shown in equation 2.22.













Following an electron-hole pair generation, the electron-hole pair may recombine if there’s
no electric field. If an electric field is present (such as pn-junction or biasing) then the
electron and hole will drift in opposite directions to create a transient current. If there is
sufficient laser energy, e.g. over 10ns, the transient current may change the transistor bias
point and also change the parasitic capacitance characteristics. These changes can lead to
delays or speed increases in the circuit. Charge collection mechanisms include charge drift,
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diffusion as well as funneling in sub-micron transistors where complex simulations have
been performed to study possible mechanisms, see Figure 2.5. Drift (which also includes
charge funneling, where the ion track distorts the electric field lines, allowing collection by
drift beyond the depletion region) occurs quickly unlike diffusion which is slow.
Figure 2.5: Laser pulse effect on semiconductor: electron-hole generation a), drift b),
diffusion c) and resultant displacement current (below) [4].
For example, in a CMOS inverter if the input is a rising edge, and the PMOS transistor
is irradiated, the output signal is delayed. If the input is a falling edge and the NMOS
transistor is irradiated then the output is also delayed [46]. In general, it is more practical to
affect the NMOS transistor since it has lower doping concentration (thus electrons/carriers
have higher mobility), although PMOS transistors can also be affected but require higher
irradiation. In deep sub-micron technologies, the induced current (normally a peak current
caused by funneling followed by slower drop in current due to diffusion process) may also
disturb the timing characteristics of other gates. The increase in delays help to induce a
fault by violating the setup times, etc. Effect of laser pulses on memory has also been
investigated and simulated using Spice [48], where the laser was modeled as a voltage
controlled current generator.
The incident laser pulse energy can be represented in equation 2.20 if one ignores
reflection and assumes uniform penetration depth [49], where h is Planck’s constant, c is the
heat conductivity of the material, LET is linear energy transfer and q is electronic charge.
The LET is typically used to measure particle charge generation capability [50]. It has been
19
suggested that angled laser strikes would increase the charge collection (LETeffective =
LET
cos θ
, where θ =0°for perpendicular strike onto surface of IC), however it’s also likely that this
charge would spread over more than one circuit node. This formulation is typically used
in the field of Single Event Errors (SEEs) which studies effects of radiation on ICs (such
as alpha particle radiation in satellites). However, LET is the action of radiation on
matter (measured as keV
µm
) and is typically simulated by laser pulses but does not apply to
photons [29]. Nevertheless, LET and penetration depth is typically simulated in lasers by
changing the beam spot diameter and wavelengths. Radiation from the laser is absorbed
uniformly in a sphere of radius ro and in steady state, the change in temperature, T , for
all r > ro is shown in equation 2.21 along with the time to heat up a small region t [51].
The parameters are P , the power absorbed, and s, the specific heat. The device may be
heated before thermal equilibrium occurs.
EΛ =














The voltage controlled current generation model used to simulate the induced current
produced by laser irradiation in semiconductors is shown below in equation 2.22, where
p, q, s, c1, cc2, β, γ are constants [48]. The variables S, d, V represent the surface area under
laser irradiation, the distance from center of laser spot to sensitive location of current















Research has shown that heat alone can be used to change bit values in memory. For
example in [52], over 30/300 seconds are required to change a bit in EEPROM using
10mW/50mW 650nm/1065nm laser using frontside/backside illumination, respectively.
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In continuous wave lasers, induced substrate currents were found to cause more per-
turbations to nearby gates and thus cause IC damage. In contrast researchers found that
pulsed lasers were preferred since the substrate current was more limited and thus more
local perturbations could be produced [46].
2.3 Photoexcitation Effect of Laser on Silicon
SRAM laser exposure is known to cause bit-flips in [29,31,53], a phenomenon called Single
Event Upset (SEU). By tuning the beam’s energy level below a destructive threshold, the
target will not suffer any permanent damage. A conventional one-bit SRAM cell is made of
two cross-coupled inverters as shown in Figure 2.6. Every cell has two additional transistors
controlling the cell’s content access during write and read. As every inverter is made of two
transistors, an SRAM cell contains six Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistors
(MOSFETs).
In each cell, the states of four transistors encode the stored value. By design, the cell
admits only two stable states: a '0' or a '1'. In each stable state, two transistors are at an
on state and two others are off.
If a laser beam hits the drain/bulk reversed-biased pn-junctions of a blocked transistor,
the beam’s energy may create pairs of electrons and holes as the beam passes through
the silicon. The charge carriers induced in the collection volume of the drain-substrate
junction of the blocked transistor are collected and create a transient current that inverts
logically the inverter’s output voltage. This voltage inversion is in turn applied to the
second inverter that switches to its opposite state: all in all, a bit flip happens as reported
in [31,53].
From the attacker’s perspective, an additional advantage of LFI is reproducibility. Iden-
tical faults can be repeated by carefully tuning the laser’s parameters and the target’s op-
erating conditions. Lasers are mainly divided into two categories: continuous and pulsed.
L 
-1I 
Figure 2.6: A typical one-bit SRAM cell.
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2.3.1 Continuous vs pulsed laser
Pulsed laser refers to any laser not classified as continuous laser, where the optical laser
pulses are of some duration at a certain repetition rate. A continuous laser source emits
a laser beam of a constant power over time. Some laser can’t simply run in continuous
mode because it would require pumping the laser at a very high continuous power level
which would be impractical or destroy the laser by producing excessive heat [33]. In
our FI application, the pulsed laser is preferred to avoid damaging the DUA. There are
different ways to make a laser source pulsed such as using Q-switching or mode-locking.
Pulse durations from Q-switched lasers typically vary between 100ps and hundreds of ns.
Mode-locked lasers can generate pulses with durations between ≈ 5fs and hundreds of ps.
2.4 Tunable Parameters in LFI
In a laser attack, the attacker usually controls the beam’s diameter (AKA spot size),
wavelength, amount of emitted energy, impact coordinates (attacked circuit part) and the
exposure’s duration (laser pulse width) or number of laser pluses. Also, the attacker may
also synchronize the LFI with a given clock cycle of the target, or control the target’s clock
frequency, Vdd, temperature of DUA or alter the threshold voltage, Vth. According to [54],
the pulse width can be controlled for both pulsed and continuous lasers.
The power of the laser beam could be tuned using a half-wave plate (or retarders) [55]
and an attenuator. Power loss occurs for the beam when passing through the optics as noted
in the manual for the Video Microscope Unit (VMU) [56]. For example, the transmission
% for a 1064nm beam through the VMU-LB is 54% for a pulse width ≥ 10ns with an
upper limit of laser input of 110 mJ
cm2
per pulse for a Nd:YAG laser passing through an M
Plan Apo NIR series objective. If the pulse width of the laser is to be shorted, reduce the
upper limit of laser input density by the square root of the pulse width ratio. For example,




Finally, laser attacks may attack the decapped chip from the frontside or backside.




The laser attacks on frontside decapsulated chips are particularly suited to green wave-
length (532nm) but IR can be used as well. The visibility of chip’s components makes
positioning very easy in comparison to backside attacks. But, because of the metallic in-
terconnects’ reflective effect, it is difficult to target a component with enough accuracy. In
addition, sometimes the chip’s layout has a mesh protection for tamper resistance [57]. On
the other hand, progress in manufacturing technologies results in both a proliferation of
metal interconnects and much smaller chips. All in all, it becomes increasingly difficult to
hit a target area from the frontside.
2.4.2 Backside
The silicon substrate is a transparent area for IR wavelengths [58]. According to this prop-
erty, the backside laser attacks are more efficient as the IR rays (1064nm) enter deeply into
the silicon and target components from the backside. Positioning may be more difficult
due to the lack of visibility, unless sufficient NIR illumination and special NIR/SWIR cam-
eras are available. Nevertheless, backside attacks avoid the problem of reflective metallic
surfaces.
Figure 2.7 shows absorption coefficient for silicon at various doping levels of a p-type
material. The photon energy is a function of laser’s wavelength. The vertical solid and
dashed lines mark the photon energy corresponding to the wavelengths 1.06µm and 0.80µm
respectively.
In [58], the effective penetration depth in silicon, which is the average distance travelled
by a photon before it gets absorbed, could be roughly estimated for different wavelengths
knowing that the effective penetration depth is the inverse of the absorption coefficient. For
example, the effective penetration depth in the silicon substrate is ∼ 1.27µm and 900 nm
for 532nm (green) and 1064nm (IR) wavelengths respectively. Therefore, according to
Figure 2.7, a 1064nm wavelength has a deep penetration in the silicon layer and is suitable
for backside laser fault injection on the integrated circuits. Besides, for a frontside attack,
wavelengths lower than 0.80 µm are suitable as they don’t enter deeply into the silicon [5].
This range includes the 532nm green laser wavelength.
Before performing the laser fault injection, the target circuit must be prepared for
such attacks. That process is called sample preparation. The sample preparation mainly
consists of decapsulation and RE of different structures inside the DUA. Depending on the
equipment and attack’s requirements, the frontside or the backside of the circuit will need
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to be decapsulated. The decapsulation procedure will be further demonstrated in section
5.1.
Figure 2.7: Absorption coefficient for silicon at various doping levels of a p-type material [5].
2.5 Summary
This chapter briefly reviewed some fundamental theories in laser beams and their applica-
tion to FI. Both the wave and particle theories were utilized to explain effects of optics on
the the laser beam and how the laser is absorbed when directed on a DUA. Different wave-
lengths were investigated to determine the suitability for either frontside/backside attacks.




Although the focus of this thesis is on decapsulation/LFI, other types of attacks and
countermeasures are also relevant and/or applicable. For example, countermeasures for
RE may also apply to decapsulation and LFI. Hence, this chapter further defines and
examines previous research in a wide range including decapsulation, RE, microprobing,
FI, and LFI.
3.1 Reverse Engineering
This section will focus on the structural RE of ASICs and custom ICs which is considered an
invasive attack. The RE steps that can be followed to reconstruct a chip will be discussed.
We’ll mention the required tools for each step along the way. This section provides the flow
for the RE steps. Section 3.2 will focus on microprobing as an important tool facilitating
the RE process and also discusses several techniques for modifying the chip under analysis.
Structural RE requires a series of procedures [20] that can be summarized in Figure 3.1.
The starting point for the RE is a high-end manufactured chip that the reverse engineer
knows nothing about its internal structure and the outcome of the RE process is a netlist
specifying every minute detail in the structure of that sophisticated chip. The final product
of RE can be a complete set of functional analysis reports, architecture blocks, hierarchical
schematics, hierarchical netlist, simulated waveforms, block diagrams, timing diagrams,
and/or circuit equations. In the following subsections, a detailed description is presented
for each RE step.
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Although the focus of this proposal is on decapsulation/LFI, other types of attacks and 
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3.1.1 RE 
We are going to focus on the structural RE of ASICs and custom ICs which is considered an 
invasive attack. Herein under we state the RE steps that can be followed to reconstruct a chip. 
We’ll mention the required tools for each step along the way. This section provides flow for the 
RE steps. Section 3.1.2 will focus on microprobing as an important tool facilitating the RE process 
and also discusses several techniques for modifying the chip under analysis. 
Structural RE requires a series of procedures [6] that can be summarized in Figure 3-1. The start 
product of the RE is a high-end manufactured chip that the reverse engineer knows nothing about 
its internal structure and the outcome of the RE process a netlist specifying every minute detail 
in the structure of that sophisticated chip. The final product of RE can be a complete set of 
functional analysis reports, architecture blocks, hierarchical schematics, hierarchical netlist, 
simulated waveforms, block diagrams, timing diagrams, and/or circuit equations. In the 
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3.1.1.1 Decapsulation 
The very first step is to get the chip to be analyzed out of its package. This is called 
decapsulation or depackaging. We’ll assume that nothing is known about that chip in terms of 









Figure 3-1 RE flow Figure 3.1: RE flow.
3.1.1 Decapsulation
The very first step is to get the chip to be analyzed out of its package. This is called
decapsulation or depackaging. We’ll assume that nothing is known about that chip in
terms of pin assignment or data sheets. It’s recommended to do a functional analysis if
the packing doesn’t obstruct that. Getting some hints at this stage will be of a great
help when trying to relate the chip functions with its internal structure. The tools needed
for depackaging are usually affordable and cheap. Chemical acids, which are corrosive
and dangerous, are needed as an etching agent for plastic packages. Safety-goggles, acid-
resistant gloves and clothing should be worn. The chemical work should be done in a
fume cupboard to limit the exposure to toxic fumes resulting of the package-etching acid
(usually fuming nitric acid with a concentration ≥ 95%). A mixture of fuming nitric acid
and concentrated sulphuric acid can be used to speed up the process and avoid reacting with
the silver bonding pads. The process of decapsulation starts by milling a hole in the package
then applying the acid on that area. The tools required for milling can be purchased from
a “Do it yourself”shop. The etched plastic residues are removed through an ultrasound
bath. Another interesting approach, instead of milling, is taping the package with an acid-
resistant tape leaving the part to be etched untapped. The tapped chip is immersed in the
acid that etches the uncovered part exposing the die. This method is used for Quad Flat
Package (QFP), Thin Small Outline Package (TSOP) and Ball Grid Array (BGA) packages.
Another method for manual etching without chemicals is performed through milling down
the chip form the rear side to the copper layer which is removed mechanically. This method
is used for smart cards. The Laboratory for Physical science [59] reported that any part
in plastic and BGA interposer packages can be extracted with better than 90% yield. An
IC (de)soldering station might be needed for decapsulation; oscilloscope, logic/spectrum
analyzer and signal generator for system-level functional analysis.
In [60], various decapsulation techniques are discussed. Samples of ARM Cortex-M3,
a 65nm FPGA and AVR MCUs were decapped from the frontside chemically as well as
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AVR MCUs and the 65nm FPGA from the backside mechanically. The technology nodes
of the devices under attack ranged from 250nm to 65nm.
Backside decapsulation of chip is essential for photon emission analysis (PEA) [61, 62]
which is used as a passive undetectable attack by capturing intrinsic emissions of switching
transistors from the backside of a decapsulated chip. However, PEA requires millions of
traces which could be thwarted by the number of executions of the security algorithm
running on the DUA.
3.1.2 Deprocessing
After getting the multi-layered silicon die out of the package, the reverse engineer starts
deprocessing or delayering the die. Deprocessing is actually the opposite process for chip
fabrication. In the delayering process, the aim is to remove one layer after another while
imaging each layer before removal until the last bottom layer is reached. Those images
will be used together to reconstruct the whole netlist of the chip. The very top layer of
a silicon die is a special layer called the passivation layer and its removal exposes the top
metal layer allowing microprobing attacks. The deprocessing is either done mechanically
through polishing or chemically through etching. Etching is either wet or dry (plasma). The
mechanical polishing is time-consuming but useful for a multilayer interconnect fabricated
with advanced planarization techniques. Wet etching is isotropic while dry etching is
anisotropic. Removing each layer can make use of the proper etchant as mentioned in
Table 3.1. Since delayering stared with the top layer so it’s called frontside delayering.
There’s also backside delayering which applies to flip-chip circuit packaging. Backside
delayering requires removing most of the silicon die thickness before the circuitry can be
imaged and knowing the thickness of the remaining silicon after each thinning step is
critical. Also backside access can be used to localize silicon access while preserving the
electrical capabilities. The challenge is to enable a clean and fast localized access through
silicon. Backside delayering could be useful to bypass the coating or upper mesh layer that
signals an alarm if a wire is broken or two signals are shorted.
3.1.3 Imaging
Taking thousands of high-quality images from referenced locations to each layer of the chip
throughout the delayering process is very crucial to reconstructing the whole chip. For
technology nodes starting from 0.18µm and larger, a high-resolution optical microscope
will be sufficient. Note that the depth of focus helps in separating different layers. For
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Table 3.1: Proper etchant for different materials [13].
Material Wet etching chemicals Dry etching gases
Si HF +HNO3, KOH CF4, C2F6, SF6
Poly Si HF + CH3COOH +HNO3 CF4, SF6
SiO2 HF,HF +NH4OH CF4, CF4 +O2, CHF3
Al HCl,H2O2 +H2SO4, HPO3 +HNO3 + CH3COOH,KOH CCl4, BCl3
W, Ti HF +HNO3, H2O2 +H2SO4, H2O2 CF4
Si3N4 HF +HNO3, HPO3, Nitrietch CF4
Polyimide H2O2, H2O2 +H2SO4 CF4, CF4 +O2
smaller technology nodes, a SEM, transmission electron microscope or scanning capacitance
microscope (SCM) will be needed for a resolution ≤ 10nm. The SEM uses electron particle
gun for top and cross-sectional views with a resolution limit of 1nm while transmission
electron microscope gives high resolution 3D images of the device structure with 1− 3pm
precision [63], and SCM allows seeing the positive and negative doping which form the
actual working transistors, resistors, etc., in the silicon chip with a resolution limit of 2nm.
Layer imaging is usually done overnight using automatic 2D sub-micron steppers integrated
with the microscope.
3.1.4 Stitching and Aligning
After layer imaging is done for each and every layer, a special developed software stitches
thousands of images together. The alignment of images of multiple layers is critical to
proceed through the image stitching process and is verified through the lining up of vias
and contacts with the layers above and below. More software work will be needed for the
aligning phase.
3.1.5 Annotation
At this stage, labeling transistors, on-chip capacitors, on-chip resistors, on-chip inductors,
interconnects, vias, contacts, etc., in all layers is mandatory before we are able to read
back the circuit. This labeling can be done automatically using a tool such as Chipworks
ICWorks Surveyor [64] or manually.
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3.1.6 Verification and schematic creation
The annotation is error-prone either because it’s done manually by an extraction engineer
or automatically with issues in the images themselves like bits of dust or the image stitching
software introduced errors while integrating images. Therefore, verification is performed
through design rule checks looking for any issues like spaces smaller than the feature size,
hanging wires, shorted wires, etc. Then, the tool can extract the netlist creating a flat
schematic. Also the netlist is checked for errors like shorted inputs/outputs/ supplies,
floating gates/nets, etc.
3.1.7 Schematic organization and analysis
Now a certain level of expertise is required to organize different blocks in the schematic
in a logical hierarchy that makes the design easy to understand. Irrelevant placement of
blocks in the schematic will make the schematic look very strange and hard to understand.
The organization and analysis phase is iterative. Analysis can be done in hand using
the transistor and logic theory or using tools like ICWorks tools. The final product of
the structural RE is a report comprising a number of hierarchical schematics/netlists,
waveform, timing diagram, masks, layouts, etc., and everything else that enables a Design
and manufacturing company (DMC) [65] to manufacture the analyzed chip.
3.2 Microprobing
A brief introduction to microprobing attacks and the required setup of such type of attack
was presented in section 2.1.2. In this section, more microprobing attacks and counter-
measures to those attacks are discussed.
In [66, 67], a theoretical foundation was proposed for protecting Boolean circuits from
probing attacks as well as similar types of attacks that rely on leaked information from
electrical circuits. The attacker is assumed to have limited capabilities observing up to any
t internal wires. The proposed solution shows that any circuit can resist probing attacks
using a generic defensive design strategy. That solution encodes the input/output/internal
nodes in a certain way that makes the circuits perfectly secure against an attacker with t
probes during a certain clock cycle at the expense of increased hardware overhead. In [67],
the proposed solution was refined to be secure against unbounded number of reset-only wire
faults but limited to only a bounded number of arbitrary wire faults per clock cycle. Since
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the faults per clock cycle might be permanent so the total number of introduced faults in
more than one clock cycle is unbounded. One of the disadvantages of such countermeasure
is the large overhead of the added circuitry. The added circuitry is a function in the number
of adversarial probes the designer wishes to tolerate. Also the countermeasure is mainly
designed to protect circuits against physical probing attacks.
In [45], the backside of modern ICs is considered the weakest link because it’s not
protected against fully-invasive attacks at all. Both backside probing and edit attacks
have been carried out on two target ICs (Atmel AT90SC3232C and ATmega328P). The
edit attack was to circumvent the copy protection by modifying the security fuse while
the probing was to extract decrypted data. The DUAs were mechanically decapsulated
from the backside using the Ultratec ASAP-1 [68] down to 30µm substrate thickness. The
Hammamatsu PHEMOS-1000 was used to produce reflective laser scanning images of the
ATMega328P. These images were used to identify the points of interest to perform the
attacks. For AT90SC3232C, optical microscope images were acquired. The FIB used a
wavelength transparent to silicon i.e. 1000 nm. The probing attack was done using a
Karl Süss PA 150 probing station was used in conjunction with Karl Süss PH 150
micro-manipulators and GGB T-4-10 probing needles.
In [57], a countermeasure to protect the IC from the backside attacks by stacking mul-
tiple dies inside a 3D mesh. To prove manufacturability, a passive cage was implemented
using 130nm 6-metal-layers technology to protect an 8-bit register. The cage was a 26µm
wide cube and provided very good RE protection. The cage design is based on a Hamil-
tonian path, which is an undirected path passing once through all the vertices of a graph.
If any of the vertices is a transistor, then the cage is considered active otherwise it’s a
passive cage. Dynamic or active cages contained hardware canaries. A hardware canary
(also defined as a configurable switch box) was defined as a binary constant placed be-
tween a buffer and stack data to detect buffer overflows. Upon buffer overflow, the canary
gets corrupted and an overflow exception is thrown. The hardware canary is formed of a
spatially distributed chain of functions positioned at the vertices of a 3D cage surrounding
a protected circuit. A correct response from those functions to a challenge will attest the
canary’s integrity. One of the advantages of this countermeasure is that it’s purely digital,
not an analog sensor or a physical unclonable function (PUF), so it’s portable across dif-
ferent technology nodes. Also, this countermeasure is effective against Focused Ion Beam
(FIB) attacks as FIB attacks target interconnections of the cage not the values inside the
switches so the FIB attack becomes very complex.Therefore, these 3D canaries act as cryp-
tographically secure meshes. However, this countermeasure is costly when trying to thwart
backside attacks because of the high cost of 3D IC manufacturing therefore it should be
implemented only when truly needed.
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In [69], Weiner et al. present a 65nm low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient
approach to detect micro-probing through comparing delay differences between symmetric
lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of
a probe. Their simulation results show different LAPD implementations that can detect
state-of-the-art commercial microprobes under both typical and worst case conditions. The
area overhead for the added circuitry is relatively low compared to other protection mech-
anisms, such as the probe attempt detector (PAD) [70] or bus encryption. A calibratable
lightweight invasive attack detector (CaLIAD) is proposed in [71] to account for manu-
facturing variations as well as small layout imbalances while maintaining the low rate of
false positives. The resolution of detection is 5fF and 11fF under typical and worst case
conditions respectively. The CaLIAD uses only digital components such as LAPD but has
an area overhead in between LAPD and PAD so it can be considered the best tradeoff
between LAPD and PAD.
In [72], the original protective (tough and chemically inert) coating was used as a
fingerprint to detect any attacks from the frontside. This countermeasure is proven to
be secure against FIB attacks. Physical attacks by making a hole through the coating
are detected from the difference in capacitance measurements. The opaque protective
coating was sprayed only on the frontside and it’s questionable if it could be applied
from the backside. This countermeasure acts as coating PUF covering the frontside of IC
that needs protection. On-chip measurement circuit that measures capacitance values at
several sensors was developed. To verify the countermeasure empirically, two holes were
made by Gallium FIB leading to differences in capacitance measurements, thus the attack
was detected.
In [73], optical interaction concepts are utilized for both security protection as well
as introducing a security risk. For protection, the light emission from the operation of
forward-biased p-n junction, which is considered as a LED, is detected by depleted areas
like reverse p-n junctions, which are considered photocurrent detectors. The backside of
the IC is coated with an optically active layer that reflects the light emitted by the LED,
which in turn, is to be detected by the photodetectors. The backside protection layer
provides angle dependent reflection and full transmission blocking so any damage in this
protection layer will affect the angle of reflection for one or more of the LED light beams
to be detected by the photodetectors. Therefore, the detected photocurrent can be used
to verify the integrity of the backside protection layer and detect attacks. On the other
hand, an attack on ring oscillator (RO) PUFs using electro-optical frequency modulation
(EOFM) and electro-optical probing (EOP), a laser voltage probing (LVP) derivative that
has been rarely used for security attacks, was presented. Power analysis of the RO in the
frequency domain to estimate the approximate RO frequency followed by super-positioning
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of the enough near-by frequencies led to detecting all the ROs and registers switching with
the same frequency through PEA. Finally according to [74], once the precise frequency of
RO PUF is known, complete characterization and cloning of the PUF is possible.
In [75], the nanopyramid appears to be an effective countermeasure against backside op-
tical attacks such as LVP. The nanopyramid is a passive CMOS compatible countermeasure
that doesn’t consume any energy and has no area overhead. Normally, the nanopyramids
are inserted in between the transistor layer and the metal layer; while for a Silicon on
Insulator (SOI) the nanopyramids are inserted beneath the transistors. According to the
reported simulation results, the nanopyramid can disturb the optical measurements enough
to make LVP attacks practically infeasible. The nanopyramid demonstrates a change in
the reflection behavior of the active devices due to the enhanced scattering which arises
from the pyramids. Due to the randomness of the nanopyramid in terms of size and loca-
tion, the optical reflection collected from the nanopyramid devices is not reliable, thus an
efficient LVP attack can be prevented.
3.3 Fault Injection and Laser-based Attacks
This section first generally reviews FI using other techniques such as glitching, EM FI,
etc., and then focuses on the use of lasers and IR wavelengths in FI attacks and their
countermeasures.
3.3.1 General Fault Injection
In general, FI has been used to launch attacks on crypto-systems through glitching the
clock or Vdd, injecting an EM pulse or laser [18]. Two attacks utilize FI: one is instruction
skipping and the other is injecting faults in crypto algorithms. For example, in [76], the
full 128-bit AES key was extracted by means of a side-channel attack (SCA) in less than
one hour leaving no physical traces and using low-cost equipment. Table 3.2 summarizes
some known attacks on 128-AES as well as their requirements and shows targets of fault
injections where faulty cipher text can be utilized to derive secret information such as
the key; column 2 gives the target location (e.g., state or key byte), column 3 reports
the requirement necessary to perform the attack in terms of spatial accuracy and the last
column gives the number of distinct faults that must be injected to retrieve the secret key.
For instance, in [77], a single bit in the plain-text M0 has to be faulted. From Table 3.2, it
is clear that simply being able to inject a single fault is far from being sufficient to perform
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an attack. The fault has to be injected at the right moment and has to affect either only
one bit or only one byte without impacting other data. Although lasers have a sufficient
timing accuracy to fulfill the first requirement, spatial accuracy and localization are more
difficult to manage.
Table 3.2: Some Known Attacks on AES 128 [14].
Reference Target Focalization Faults #
[77] Data (M0) Bit 128
[78] Data 7 ∗M8+Key 4 ∗K9 Byte 11
[30] Data 16 ∗M9 Bit 16
[79] Key 4 ∗K9 + 4 ∗K10+Data 4 ∗M8 Byte 12
[79] Data 4 ∗M9 or 1 ∗M8 Byte 4 or 1
[80] Round counter Round counter 1
[81] Round counter Byte 1
[82] Data 4 ∗M9 Byte 4
[83] Data before first sub-byte Bit or byte 16
[84] K7 Byte 1
[85] Data Byte 1
[86] First column of K8 Byte 1
In [87], PIC16F687 and PIC16F866 MCUs were attacked where it was noted that
MCUs generally exhibit a stronger side-channel leakage compared to FPGAs because the
number of traces required to extract the key of an AES implementation using correlation
power analysis (CPA) was one order of magnitude less in the case of MCUs. The configu-
ration bits (or more specifically the erasable programmable read only memorys (EPROMs)
bits) of a decapsulated PIC16F687 were exposed to Ultraviolet light in the C spectrum
(UV-C) to reset the security mechanism and allow code extraction. The UV-C attack
is presumably applicable for the most of the 10F to 16F series of Microchip using UV-
EPROM eraser at a certain angle to circumvent the metal shield covering the configuration
fuses.
3.3.2 Laser-based Techniques
Several laser-based failure analysis techniques have been developed, such as Light Induced
Voltage Alteration (LIVA) [88] and Optical Beam Induced Current (OBIC) [89]. LIVA is
a technique that uses carrier stimulation to induce power alteration. It uses a constant
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current source to monitor changes in voltage and has been effective in imaging defects such
as floating nodes and open conductors. Also, LIVA has been used for imaging transistor
states and controlling logic states. OBIC takes advantage of photon generated electron-
hole pairs to yield information about IC defects and functionality. It was shown in [27]
that it is possible to read out masked read-only memory (ROM) by measuring the OBIC
of the DUA MC68HC705P6A.
In [90], it has been noted that when the laser beam hits the pn-junction of a transistor,
a current is created that might charge or discharge the output of the targeted gate. When
targeting, e.g., SRAM or flip-flops (FFs), the state might be permanently altered. However,
when shooting at general combinatorial logic, the effect caused by the laser is only transient
which means that the circuit will restore its normal behavior, depending on its input,
when the laser excitation is stopped. They investigated the transient effect of LFI on
the substitution box (S-box) and noticed that increasing the intensity of the laser beam
increased the number of affected bits. They successfully attacked an AES co-processor
on an Atmel ATxmega16A4U with minimal feature size of 250nm. The backside of the
DUA was thinned to approximately 20µm remaining substrate. The used microscope
was by Opto GmbH. The objective used was a 10x Mitutoyo Plan Apo NIR objective
(with NA = 0.26). Two 975nm single mode fiber-coupled on-demand laser diodes were
focused at the same spot with maximum power. The reported measured peak power was
0.52W . The timing of the laser pulse was controlled by a Stanford Research Systems
DG645 programmable delay generator based on a trigger signal at the start of each single
AES encryption (a single AES encryption needed 375 cycles). The relation (1.22λ)
NA
was used
to calculate the minimum spot size (which is typically used for light not for collimated
beams i.e. lasers [56]). An Ophir Spiricon SP620U beam profiling camera (resolution of
4.4µm) was used to measure the spot size. The laser pulse width was measured through
a photo-diode in the optical path (converted to a voltage by a shunt and amplified using
a Langer PA303 amplifier). It was mentioned that the laser pulse had to start before and
end after the rising edge of the clock signal to attain an 80% successful LFI rate.
In [91], OBIC was used as an imaging technique to reduce the search space significantly
and find areas of interest in the DUA. The same LFI setup in [90] was used.
In [92], He − Ne laser (0.63µm, 1mW ) was focused down on the silicon wafer surface
to an area of ∼ 5µm spot size using a 10x objective in order to measure diffusion length
in silicon. The laser beam was focused on the silicon substrate surface and excess carriers
were generated at a known rate by the 1mW He − Ne laser. Then the resulting total
carrier number was detected by a novel IR emission technique proposed by the authors.
The number of the detected carriers determine the diffusion length at that location and
it was found that the number of carriers drop exponentially when moving laterally away
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from the laser spot.
3.3.3 Laser Fault Injection
In this subsection, we’ll focus on the fault injection using laser, how it emerged and known
countermeasures against such type of attack.
In [29], optical fault induction attacks have been introduced knowing the fact that
optical radiation could ionize semiconductor regions if the radiation’s energy exceeds the
band gap of the semiconductor. A common PIC16F84 MCU was decapped from the
frontside and the SRAM was attacked with a flash lamp and a 1500x objective mounted
on a Wentworth Labs MP-901 manual probing station. Single bit flips from 0 to 1 and from
1 to 0 were performed. The limitation was that the flash lamp doesn’t produce even and
monochromatic light and was difficult to be controlled; so using a laser came as an idea to
overcome this limitation. A cheap class-II laser pointer (< 1mW and 650 nm wavelength)
was used then instead of the flash lamp and was operated with a supply current so that
it can output up to 10 mW. The laser beam was focused down to ∼ 1µm spot. It has
been noted that X-rays could penetrate most types of protective packaging likely to be
encountered in practice therefore investigating whether the X-rays could be used to inject
faults or not is worthwhile. Also, countermeasures such as top-layer metal shielding could
be defeated by X-rays or IR laser; and bus encryption could be circumvented through direct
register attacks. Therefore, those countermeasure aren’t effective against LFI. Dual-rail
logic was proposed as a countermeasure to flipping bits.
Insights about choosing the right laser setup are provided in [60] like choosing the suit-
able wavelength, spot size and laser power; then followed by some hands-on experience on
device profiling for performing successful attacks such as counting for the attack location,
pulse power, pulse duration (glitch length) and offset after triggering. The reported laser
spot size varied between 10 and 800µm2 with ≥ 90% success rates of bit flips. Every DUA
required a different fault injection threshold which means that every DUA required differ-
ent exposure time to the laser beam such that the state changes to a faulty one. So the
safest option was to start at the lowest power then use small incremental steps to avoid
destructive changes. Surprisingly, it was found that the percentage of power needed for
fault injection in smaller technology nodes is higher than that for older technology nodes.
A 20W 1064nm was used for backside FI and that power was reduced by the objectives to
∼ 7−8W . For the 65nm FPGA, at least 80% of the laser power was needed to inject faults
while for old MCU only 10−20% was sufficient. An X-Y stage with 0.05µm resolution was
used. The types of induced faults were bit flips, instruction skip (IS)/changes, execution
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disturbance and bit flips in slice registers in FPGA. A software countermeasure against
IS proposed in [93] provides protection for embedded programs against multiple FIs at-
tacks. The main idea of that countermeasure is that it provides a generic manipulation
to the assembly code of the program executed on the DUA to protect it from IS attacks.
The countermeasure divides the instruction set, which will be manipulated, to 3 different
classes. The 1st class is composed of idempotent instructions which can provide fault tol-
erance by simply duplicating those instructions. The 2nd class contains the instructions
that are not idempotent but can be replaced by an equivalent sequence of idempotent in-
structions. The 3rd class collects some specific instructions that cannot easily be replaced
by a list of idempotent instructions but for which a specific replacement sequence is pos-
sible. Moreover, the 3rd class includes the instructions for which no replacement sequence,
that ensures fault tolerance, can be provided. The solution for those instructions is either
forcing the compiler to avoid using them or using a fault detection approach. The men-
tioned IS countermeasure doesn’t claim complete protection but it claims reasonably good
protection against IS attacks using reasonable cost equipment.
In [94], physical faults have been injected in more than a hundred units of 68000 MCUs
through cutting either aluminum or poly tracks using laser. The beam accuracy was 0.1µm
in the X-Y plane. Conformity and reduced conformity (functional and reduced functional)
tests were used to detect injected faults. The reduced functional tests consisted of a random
selection of test cases instead of exhaustive exploration. The 100% detection was attained
only when the reduced conformity test program was looped because the length of the test
program had an indirect effect on the detection of some faults. For example, stuck-at
faults happen when a certain node in the circuit gets shorted either to Vdd or ground and
the value can’t be changed by software so a circuit edit would be essential to change its
value. On the other hand, open circuit faults occur when wires are cut. Also bridge faults
happen when shorts are created between wires. So LFI can be useful in pragmatic testing
of stuck-at faults by artificial realization of such faults.
In [95, 96], the high energy disturbances caused by LFI and electro-magnetic fault
injection (EMFI) were detected by a proposed phase-locked loop (PLL)-based sensor on
multiple FPGA platforms. A 20W pulsed (10 MHz) diode Riscure laser system of a
64 × 14µm2 spot size was targeted on a flip-chip 65nm Virtex-5 FPGA. The 20W power
is reduced to 10W and 8W when a 5x and 20x objectives are used respectively, due to the
losses of the used optics. The pulse length is adjustable with 1ns resolution and the offset
from the trigger to laser pulse is ≤ 60ns. During decapsulation, the heat sink of the DUA
was removed and the substrate was thinned from ∼ 300µm to ∼ 100µm. The motorized
XY stage of the laser setup had a precision of 0.05µm. The proposed sensor is sensitive
to an energy level which was much lower than the required energy to inject the fault. The
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hardware (HW) cost of the proposed sensor is one PLL block and one look-up table (LUT)
to implement a watch dog RO.
In [97,98], the authors were able to flip single bits/bytes in the SRAM of an 8-bit 0.35µm
16 MHz reduced instruction set computer (RISC) MCU. The LFI setup used was a Nd:YAG
laser with a 532nm wavelength. The beam spot size and the energy per shot were 4µm
and ∼ 15nJ at the laser source emitter before passing through a 20x Mitutoyo objective.
A motorized programmable Prior Scientific [99] X-Y stage with 0.1µm resolution was
used. A FPGA board was used to trigger the laser source. The DUA was decapsulated
from the frontside using Nisene JetEtch device that can be programmed to use arbitrary
ratios of nitric acid and sulfuric acid. A successful single-bit Giraud’s LFI attack [30] was
implemented on an AES round key by carefully controlling the laser’s shooting time and
location.
In [48], a 3W pulsed 1064nm laser source with a 50ns pulse duration was used to inject
faults from the frontside. Three objectives were used and resulted in three spot sizes:
1µm, 5µm and 20µm. The laser was used at 1.6W with 1µm spot size to inject fault in
the SRAM. The DUA was an 8-bit 0.35µm CMOS MCU.
In [100], a 532nm pulsed green laser with a 5ns pulse was used to attack the last AES-
128 round running on a DUA from the frontside. The spot size was 125µm× 125µm and
the energy density was 17 pJ
µm2
. It was possible to target the last round of the AES with
a jitter ±5ns. The DUA was a 0.13µm ASIC running at 25 MHz and had 6 metalization
levels. Single bit flips were achieved using the refraction of the laser by the metalization
levels.
In [101], a 1064nm pulsed laser was used to attack a 90nm chip from the backside. The
laser pulse duration was variable and could be set as short as tens of ns and the output
peak power varied from a few mW to 800mW . The spot size was 2µm and the FFs that
they attacked were ∼ 15µm2 and the SRAM cells were 3.25µm2.
In [102], individual bit flips were performed for both 45nm and 90nm different FPGAs
with some limitations for the former. The two DUAs are Xilinx Spartan-6 and Xilinx
Spartan-3A. The laser setup is based on a diode-pumped pulsed Nd:YAG solid-state laser
source capable of emitting two different wavelengths, 532nm and 1064nm. The laser pulse
width is fixed at 800ps and has a maximum repetition rate of 1 kHz. A beam attenuator
is used to control the amount of emitted beam energy. The DUAs were attacked from the
backside using the 1064nm laser. The width of the beam is adjusted using a beam expander
before the focusing 20x objective. A laser scanner is used to shift the beam position with a
range of ±0.25mm on the DUA at a step size of 100nm. An xyz-motorized stage is used to
position the area of interest in the DUA under the objective. The measured energy after
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all the losses from the optics ranged from 1nJ to 5µJ .
According to [14], frontside vs backside laser attacks required the characteristics men-
tioned in Table 3.3. However, [103] mentioned that no pre-thinning was required at all.
Table 3.3: Frontside and Backside Injection Characteristics according to [14].
Frontside Backside
Wavelength Used Green (532nm) or IR IR (1064nm)
Absorption Depth ≈ 1µm ≈ 100µm
Drawbacks Presence of metal layers Requires pre-thinning process
In [104–106], a high precision 6-axis translation table with 0.1µm step size was used to
hold the DUA under a Neodymium: Yttrium Lithium Fluoride (Nd:YLF) 523nm laser to
inject soft faults into electronic circuits by inducing transient errors. The used laser system
can generate 10 pulses
sec
when performing automated attacking procedures. The pulsed laser
was used to disable RO chains, flip latches repeatedly and inject transient errors in mul-
tiplying operations. Automating the process of translating the location to be attacked in
the DUA, automating the alignment procedures, fine-tuning the LFI process according the
technology node of the DUA, and synchronizing the observation of the system’s response
with the timing of the laser pulses were identified as challenges that need to be overcome
should the LFI becomes automated.
3.4 Summary
The conducted literature review led to the observation of what the previous publications
failed to study, which will be specified in this section. Most of the LFI setups mentioned
in the literature aren’t built from scratch and are either bought from Riscure or AlphaNov
as a LFI solution. However, when a LFI system is built from scratch, the details of con-
structing such setup aren’t clarified such as the presence of a collimator and/or usage of
attenuators, utilization of TEM00, alignment procedure of the laser beam with the optical
path of the microscope, the effect of fiber optic cables on single-mode lasers, losses intro-
duced to the laser beam through out its optical path from the laser source until hitting
the DUA particularly when passing through different objectives, measuring the laser beam
power before/after passing through the VMU and on the the surface of the DUA, etc. Also,
tips and tricks in the decapsulation procedure, either from the frontside/backside, are not
mentioned clearly while preparing the sample for LFI with the fact that some of the pub-
lished literature outsource the decapsulation to companies like Nisene. Characterization
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and profiling for the used laser were not performed as well as proposing fault models for
different DUAs or target areas in the DUAs. The number of pulses needed to do successful
LFI for certain devices were discovered empirically and no fault model was formulated.
Large laser beam spot sizes were touched upon in [90] but wasn’t thoroughly investigated
in the published literature.
A number of physical and logical countermeasures were compared in [107] in terms of
the cost of implementation, production and testing, level of the protection provided against
frontside and backside attacks, expertise and equipment required for a successful attack,
impact on design flow and manufacturing process, reliability such as temperature effect on
such countermeasures and the rate of false detections of attacks. Examples of those physi-
cal countermeasures are photodetectors, shielding, voltage/temperature sensors and other
unique structures; while parity, majority and redundancy checks were presented as logical
countermeasures. However, the path for these countermeasures to become practical was
obstructed due to many reasons such as the large costly changes required in the fabrication
process to implement such countermeasures. However it is important to fully understand
the processing and experimental details of fault injection before one can understand how






This chapter will list the research objectives, describe the methodology and provide an
overview of the experimental setup. First, the objectives are stated followed by the method-
ology to be applied to achieve those objectives. Then the development of the laser bench
setup is illustrated. This chapter also presents the custom-designed development PCB for
ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102, SEM measurements of die thickness, and illuminated
images of lab decapsulated chips using SWIR and NIR backside imaging.
4.1 Objectives
Unlike previous research, this research tries to unfold the details of the sample preparation
process for different DUAs, mainly the decapsulation steps for different types of packages
and RE the structure of those DUAs. Also, this work precisely identifies the target clock
cycle to inject faults in ICs using a class-IV laser so that one or more bit values are flipped
to a desired value; for example, for the purpose of interrupting the boot up sequence to
extract confidential information (e.g. secret key) or manipulating the execution order of a
running program. A Demo LFI attack on a real application like AES and targeting differ-
ent structures on chip such output of the Flash memory (i.e. instruction register), debug
circuitry, UART and configuration bits were other objectives. Finally, this study pro-
poses countermeasures to LFI, RE and/or sample preparation for the different structures
mentioned above in commercial chips.
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4.2 Methodology
Different types of hardware hacking may be performed according to how destructive or
invasive the adversary can afford to be. Each path through the tree in Figure 4.1 (from
the root to a leaf) indicates a possible scenario for the DUA hacking. For example, the left
path in Figure 4.1 represents a context where the hacker has access to only one sole device,
but no other devices or even similar devices are available. In this case, the hacker may not
be able to perform invasive or destructive attacks such as RE since these attacks may harm
the device. Alternatively, there may be only one device available however there may be
some similar devices, see “Some Similar Devices” from the right branch at the “Only One
Device” node of Figure 4.1. In this case the hacker may gain further information about part
of the DUA from the similar devices. For example, a military communication device may
be under attack and only one is available. However, the hacker may know or determine
that a core in the military chip is also available commercially (for example a processor
core). Thus RE of the similar device may reveal important information used to attack
the single device. Alternatively, the hacker may gain access to only one device, yet also
have access to another device which contains the same core. For example, an attacker may
reverse engineer the similar device to determine the architecture of the processor core, thus
enabling a targeted side channel analysis on the real DUA. On the right most branch at
the root of the tree of Figure 4.1 is the opposite case where the hacker has access to “Many
Devices”. Identical devices are available for invasive destructive experimentations, in order
to determine sufficient information to launch an effective attack on the device. Although the
hacker may have access to multiple devices, these devices may either have different keys or
a common key (“Key per device” or “Same Key” in Figure 4.1, respectively). Realistically
multiple keys exist in the device, however we assume one key under attack in Figure 4.1
for illustration purposes only. Our LFI research will focus first on the “Many-Devices”
approach till the LFI technique is mastered then “Only One/Some-Device(s)” approaches
could be investigated using LFI. As an example, home IoT devices could be the DUAs
as they are cheaply made and many of those IoT devices use the same symmetric key.
Therefore, if the AES key is retrieved from one of those devices using LFI or any other
attack method, it would impose a security threat/breach in all the other devices using the
same key. On the other side, implementing public-key cryptography (PKC) or asymmetric
encryption would support a unique private key per device and thus would protect other
IoT devices if the private key of a single devices is compromised. So using PKC would
allow more secured IoT devices, generally at the expense of slower execution speed of the
asymmetric encryption algorithms. However, PKC won’t protect a single device against








































Figure 4.1: Scenarios of DUA (represented by paths through the tree).
4.2.1 General Flow
The flowchart shown in Figure 4.2 shows the main flow to successfully conduct a LFI attack





































Figure 4.2: General flow for LFI.
4.2.2 Flow for Decapsulation
The flowchart shown in Figure 4.3 demonstrates the proposed methodology for preparing
a sample DUA through frontside or backside decapsulation. Further details and results of
both frontside and backside decapsulation are presented in detail in section 5.1.
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Figure 4.3: Methodology for decapsulation.
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4.3 Experimental setup
The equipment setup for LFI and PEM, DUA sample preparation, laser pulse characteri-
zation and induced switching current setups will be described in this section.
Pulse-on-DemanD moDules
PDm Series
Ph. +33 (0)5 24 54 52 00 
info@alphanov.com - www.alphanov.com




PDM+ PDM+ HP PDM4+ PDM4+ HP
Peak power Up to 2W Up to 3.2W Up to 6W Up to 10W
Pulse width From 2ns to CW From 4ns to CW From 2ns to CW From 4ns to CW




wavelengths (nm) 808, 976, 1030, 1064, 1075
(1) 976,1064, 808(2)
Operating mode Pulsed and CW Pulsed and CW




Output fiber SM/PM SM/PM
Electrical
Operating voltage 12-15 Vdc (OEM) 110/220V
ac/dc converter included
Input impedance 50 Ω
Options
• Polarized fiber (single-mode only)
• Output isolator
• Narrow emission bandwidth
• Separated collimator
• Interlock
• Various fiber connectors (FC, SMA...)
PDM+ and PDM+ HP PDM4+ and PDM4+ HP
(1) Other available wavelengths: 845, 1310, 1480, 1550 nm...
(2) Choose two wavelengths from 976, 1064, 808 nm...





























Multi-Range DC Power Supplies
Models 9103 and 9104
Technical data subject to change
© B&K Precision Corp. 2017
www.bkprecision.com
Model 9103 9104
Maximum Voltage 0 - 42 V 0 - 84 V
Maximum Current 0 - 20 A 0 - 10 A
Full-Featured DC Power Supplies to 
Meet Your High Power Needs
Multi-range power supply models 9103 and 9104 
can replace several power supplies on your bench 
by offering extended operating areas.  Unlike 
conventional supplies with fixed output ratings, 
these power supplies automatically recalculate 
voltage and current limits for each setting, 
providing 320 W output power in any voltage/
current setting within the supply’s rated voltage 
and current limits.
This family of switching mode power supplies 
feature  a small form factor, auto cross-over for 
constant voltage (CV) and constant current (CC) 
operation, 3 voltage/current presets for frequent-
ly-used settings and transient operation, and 
versatile remote control modes. The dual action 
push button allows the user to set both coarse 
and fine voltage and current levels quickly and 
precisely. A remote sensing terminal compensates 
for voltage drop across load leads.
These features make the 9103 and 9104 suitable 
for a wide range of applications requiring high 
current including production testing, 
telecommunications, R&D, service, and university 
labs.
Features and Benefits
■ Automatic CV/CC crossover operation
■ Lightweight and compact
■ Save up to 3 user-defined voltage and current
presets for quick recall
■ Transient mode for generating square,
triangular or trapezium waveforms
■ PC software for remote control and external
timed programming
■ Analog remote control function
■ USB interface
■ Output on-off switch and control panel lock
button for safer operation
■ Overvoltage and overcurrent protection














Traditional power supplies with rectangular 
output characteristics are only able to deliver 
maximum output power at one voltage/current 
point. The 9103 and 9104 provide greater 
flexibility over traditional power supplies by 
extending the operating areas. For example, the 
9103 can operate at 42V / 7.6 A, 16 V / 20 A, or 
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Video Microscope U it
VMU
VMU-V VMU-H VMU-L4B
*Objectives shown mounted on tubes are optional.
> Small, lightweight microscope unit designed for a camera observation system
Suitable for observing a wide range of objects: metal, resin, printed surfaces, minute mechanisms, etc.
> Compatible wi h YAG lasers (1064nm, 532nm, 355nm and 266nm)
Suitable for cutting, trimming, repair and marking of IC wiring (Au, Al), removing and processing thin-fi lm (insulating fi lm) and repair of color fi lters (defects
repair).
> Compatible with infrared optical system
Available for internal observation of IC packages and spectral characteristics analysis using an infrared source and camera.
> Standard of telecentric refl ective illumination system with aperture diaphragm
This is the best illumination system for image processing applications (e.g. dimension measurement, form inspection and positioning) which require even
lighting.
> Extending the VMU series with high rigidity/performance VMU-LB and VMU-L4B models.
> Available for dual-camera (high & low magnifi cation) observation (VMU-LB and VMU-L4B).
Features
Model No. VMU-V VMU-H VMU-LB VMU-L4B
Order No. 378-505 378-506 378-513 378-514
Camera mounting orientation Vertical Horizontal Vertical (rotatable) Vertical (rotatable)





Optical features Magnifi cation: 1X; Wavelength (λ): visible radiation
Mount C-mount (centering and parfocal adjustment) C-mount with centering and parfocal adjustment and green fi lter switch
Tube lens (correction range) 1X (visible - NIR) 1X (NUV - visible - NIR) 1X (UV - visible - NIR)
Laser port




Mount — With parfocal adjustment
Suitable YAG 
laser type*2 —
Fundamental, second and third-
harmonic mode
Fundamental and second, third 
and fourth-harmonic mode
Polarizer*1 Available for observation Available for observation and laser applications




For observation M Plan Apo/HR/SL, G Plan Apo
For laser cutting — M/LCD Plan Apo NIR,M/LCD Plan Apo NUV
M/LCD Plan Apo NIR,
M/LCD Plan Apo NUV,
M Plan UV
Suitable camera 2/3” or smaller C-mount compatible type
Optical system illumination Telecentric refl ective with aperture diaphragm
Fiber-optic illuminator (optional) 12V/100W (378-700D), 12V/150W (178-316D)
Mass (Dimensions: Refer to page 27.) 650g 750g 1270g 1300g
*1: M Plan Apo 1X objective should be used together with the polarizer (378-710 or 378-715).
*2: When mounting a laser, ensure all safety precautions are observed and be aware of laser output power, beam energy density and the unit's weight.  Please consult Mitutoyo if in doubt.
Specifi cations
VMU-LB
Figure 4.4: Experiment setup showing con ections between PC and other devices such
as XY-stage, RIGOL 5102, power supply, PDM laser, VMU, a er , photo-detector and
oscilloscope in order to attack the DUA.
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4.3.1 LFI setup
The laser is mainly composed of AlphaNov PDM+ laser module which is a 3W funda-
mental mode 1064nm laser beam using two channels (each channel delivers approximately
1.5W) [12]. The laser source has a maximum peak current of 4000mA [108] of which
a certain percentage is used to change the amplitude of the tailored laser pulse accord-
ing to the experiments conducted. We started only by using a single channel as it was
sufficient to inject faults successfully in PIC16F687 through the 5X objective then used
both channels with the 50X objective to be able to inject faults in the ARM Cortex-M0
LPC1114FN28102. The technology node listed in Table 4.1 and 4.2 for both DUAs is
probably the reason for needing a higher power intensity to be able to inject faults in the
latter DUA. The trigger pulse to the laser beam emission delay is ∼ 20ns as reported by
Alpha. AlphaNov’s PDM+ laser module is controlled via a script using a dynamic-link
library (DLL) provided by AlphaNov.
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Figure 4.5: IR ring mechanical drawing with dimensions in mm. A real picture of the IR
ring with the IR LEDs mounted through it is shown in Figure 5.13.
The laser bench design [109, 110] utilized an optical workbench with lase enclosure,
AlphaNov PDM+ laser module, motorized XY-stage, Mitutoyo VMU and a 5X objective.
45
The laser enclosure has a glass window of optical density that protects the human eye
from the 1064nm wavelength of the laser and allows looking at the laser while in operation
although safety goggles are also worn while aligning the laser and during operation. The
laser bench is Class 1 laser (which means that laser is safe under all conditions of normal
use as specified by the IEC 60825-1 standard); hence when the enclosure is opened, an
interlock mechanism turns the laser off. The laser source is connected to the Mitutoyo
VMU using a fiber optic cable.
A Mitutoyo VMU is used to hold the 5X M Plan Apo NIR objective which allows
the laser beam to be focused. The VMU is attached to a Z-Column that allows manual
movement of the VMU in the vertical direction. A motorized XY-stage, with a precision
of 0.1µm, is attached to the Z-Column. The movement of the motorized XY-stage is
controlled through M-code commands. The motorized stage is used to adjust the position
of the DUA under the VMU. The VMU has one laser mount and one C-mount for the
camera. The laser beam is injected through the VMU and is viewed on a laptop screen
which is connected to the camera. Two cameras were utilized at different times, a CCD
NIR camera (the Allied Vision Manta G-145B NIR) for frontside/backside imaging and a
SWIR camera (the Xeva-1.7-320 TE3) for PEM backside imaging.
As the beam passes through a choice of Mitutoyo lenses, it gets reduced by the lens’
zoom factor and loses a big part of its energy. Since the 1064nm laser is not visible, we had
to use a high power IR sensor card to view the laser beam spot as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
The card we used has minimum detectable power of 1 mJ
cm2
and a damage threshold of 10 mJ
cm2
when it is exposed to a 1064nm pulsed laser. The transmission efficiency for the VMU for
the 1064nm is ∼ 54% which was measured using a S146C power meter.
Figure 4.6: Laser spot using the Mitutoyo 5X M Plan Apo NIR objective on a high power
IR sensor card.
Several experiments were conducted to measure various parameters controlling the tim-
ing and the energy of the laser pulse. A DET10A APD was used to capture a ∼ 4%
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reflection of the laser beam. A microscope slide was used to reflect the ∼ 4% of laser
beam out of the normal laser beam’s path towards the photo-detector. The photo-detector
was connected to a TDS7254 oscilloscope for various measurements such as the laser pulse
amplitude, laser pulse width, delay between triggering the laser and laser pulse generation,
etc. Both the fiber optic cable coming from the PDM+ laser source and the photo-detector
are connected to a cage that contains a 45° tilted microscope slide as shown in Figure 4.4.
In contrast to the straight-forward imaging for a frontside decapsulated DUA (by just
placing the DUA under the microscope and using the NIR camera), the backside imaging
needs special IR illumination to make the silicon substrate transparent with respect to
the SWIR or NIR cameras. An IR ring was designed to hold four MT51060-IR LEDs of
a 1060nm peak emission wavelength to provide backside imaging. Figure 4.5 shows the
3D printed IR ring with the 8 holes to hold the LEDs. The LED ring is attached to the
objective with the LEDs pointing towards the DUA.
Also an IR illuminator, MHAB-100W-IR, was used to compare its effect on the image
captured by the SWIR camera under the Mitutoyo setup vs the custom-designed IR ring.
The best achievable images for both IR sources are shown in Figure 4.7. The backside
imaging for the RISC-V FE310-G002 using the illuminator is also shown in Figure 4.8.
Details of decapsulation of this chip is given in the next chapter.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: SWIR image of PIC16F687 under the Mitutoyo setup using a)custom-designed
IR Ring and b)MHAB-100W-IR illuminator.
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Figure 4.8: SWIR image of the RISC-V backside using the Mitotoyo setup with the MHAB-
100W-IR illuminator.
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A programmable power supply, BK PRECISION 9103, is used to control the power
supplied to the DUA (power ON/OFF, over-voltage, under-voltage) which is mounted on
a development board while running different experiments. Also, an arbitrary waveform
generator, RIGOL 5102, is used to supply the DUA with the external clock needed to
operate at a certain desired frequency or inject an arbitrary number of clock cycles. All the
connections between the PC and other devices are through USB connections except the NIR
camera is via LAN. A master Python script was used to control the equipment (erasing,
programming and dumping the DUA’s memory, move XY-stage, control power supply,
arbitrary waveform generator, capture images using the NIR camera, capture wave-forms
using TDS7254 and send them to the PC) and automate running different experiments.
LFI triggering for the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114
Unlike the PIC16F687 which was used to directly trigger the laser using one of its I/O pins,
the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114 needed additional circuitry to be able to trigger the laser
source. The ARM I/O pin could not be used since it did not have sufficient current. A hex
driver, SN74AS1034AN, has been utilized to drive the 60Ω of the laser trigger in order to
achieve the necessary current. The hex driver SN74AS1034AN offers high capacitive-drive
capability to provide the sufficient current to trigger the laser source. The 60Ω laser trigger
needed at least 37mA for a 2.2V drop and the SN74AS1034AN provided 48mA. The hex
driver SN74AS1034AN delay is ∼ 8ns as per the data-sheet.
In order to make the breadboard setup more robust for the ARM, we designed a develop-
ment board for the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 that integrates the SN74AS1034AN
hex driver and provides both programming and debugging headers. The layout of the de-
sign of the PCB, manufactured PCB and soldered PCB are shown in Figures 4.9a, 4.9b
and 4.10 respectively. Moreover, to avoid the any unintentional movements of the DUA
under the VMU, the PCB is fixed on motorized XY-stage using steel standoffs, magnets
and a custom made steel plate that fits on the XY-stage as shown in Figure 4.10.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.9: a) Design of the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 PCB layout b) Manufac-
tured PCB.
Figure 4.10: Soldered PCB with a functional backside decapped ARM LPC1114.
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4.3.2 PEM setup
The PEM analysis of the DUA was investigated using the setup introduced in [6] which is
depicted in Figure 4.11. The main different components from the LFI setup were an Olym-
pus microscope (instead of the Mitutoyo VMU) with a manual XYZ-stage, a Xeva-1.7-320
TE3 SWIR camera, 10X objective (LMPLN10XIR) and a halogen lamp for illumination.
The Olympus microscope has a single camera port, which is optimized for IR wavelengths,
achieving a transmission efficiency up to ∼ 80%. This is considered a low cost setup used
for PEM [6]. Thus unfortunately the DUA had to be removed from the LFI setup and
transferred to the PEM setup whenever photon emissions were required since the VMU
was not suitable for photon emissions (transmission efficiency up to only ∼ 54%).
 
Figure 4.11: In house PEM setup [6] consisting of Xenics SWIR camera and Olympus IR
optimized microscope and objective lenses.
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4.3.3 Sample preparation
Before trying to inject faults in a sample DUA using LFI, the sample has to be prepared first
through frontside/backside decapsulation depending on the desired method of attack and
the available resources. According to the reviewed literature, the 1064nm laser is suitable
to attack from the backside since the silicon is nearly transparent to that wavelength. So
in our experiments the DUA was backside decapped mechanically using a low cost desktop
CNC machine, Nomad 883 Pro, to remove first the epoxy then the copper shield and
finally a glue layer before the silicon of the die is exposed. The glue (probably a thermal
paste to provide better heat conduction between silicon and copper) could be removed
using a plastic scrapper to avoid damaging the silicon. The final step is silicon polishing
using a wool felt tool and a 20µL droplet of a 0.04µm Colloidal Silica solution so that
the silicon surface is shiny and provides appropriate optical roughness for the 1064nm
wavelength. Substrate thinning (100’s µm) may be required before polishing (10’s µm)
but was not needed in our case. Enough photons were captured in the pre-descibed PEM
experimental setup without any thinning. Figure 4.12 shows the backside of the DUA with
some structures being identified. To measure the substrate thickness, a Hitachi S-3000N
SEM was used. Figure 4.13a and 4.13b show the thickness of the die and the active layer
respectively. The measurements acquired using the SEM were beneficial to the sample
preparation process to know how much thinning and/or polishing of the DUA could be
tolerated without inflicting damage to the active layer and hence to the functionality.
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Figure 4.12: PIC16F687 backside view captured using the 5X Mitutoyo lens and the NIR




Figure 4.13: a) Cross-sectional view of the substrate thickness captured using SEM. b)
Active layer thickness is the top part of the die and represents only ∼ 2% of the whole die
thickness.
4.3.4 Sample orientation
X-ray imaging of the DUA such as in Figure 4.14 was used alongside with backside imaging
to know the orientation of captured backside image and how the die is connected to the
pins. Further details of pin mapping to the captured backside image will be discussed in
chapter 6.
Figure 4.14: X-ray stitched image for PIC16F687 Frontside.
54
4.4 Devices under Attack
Basic introduction to the DUAs will be provided in this section. Further details about
each DUA will be provided in chapters 5 and 6. The technology node information was
obtained through contacting the manufacturers, Microchip Technology for PIC16F687-I/P
and NXP for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. In case of RISC-V FE310-G002, the
technology node was open source [111] and provided by SiFive.
4.4.1 PIC16F687
The PIC16F687 [9] applies a 2-stage pipeline with a Harvard structure. The two-stage
instruction pipeline overlaps the fetch and execution of instructions. Basic specifications
of PIC16F687 are show in Table 4.1. The specific chip used was PIC16F687-I/P and it
was a dual in-line package (DIP).
Table 4.1: Basic specifications for PIC16F687.
Parameter Value
Technology node 0.45µm
Program Memory Type Flash
Program Memory 3.5 KB
CPU Speed 5 MIPS
RAM 128 bytes
Operating Voltage Range 2 to 5.5V
Data EEPROM 256 bytes
4.4.2 ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102
The ARM Cortex-M0 [112] processor is a 32-bit RISC processor, with a 3-stage (fetch,
decode and execution) pipeline von-Neumann (load-store) architecture with a single bus
interface. Basic specifications of LPC1114FN28102 [113] are show in Table 4.2. Further
details on this processor are provided in chapter 6.
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Table 4.2: Basic specifications for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102.
Parameter Value




Operating Voltage Range 1.8 to 3.6V
ROM (Flash) 32kB
4.4.3 RISC-V
RISC-V [114] is a load–store architecture: instructions address only registers, with load
and store instructions conveying to and from memory. Basic specifications of RISC-V are
show in Table 4.3. The specific chip used was the SiFive’s FE310-G002 [111] chip featuring
E31 RISC-V core.
Table 4.3: Basic specifications for RISC-V with probable structures in Figure 4.8.
Parameter Value
Technology node 180nm TSMC CL018G process, 6 metal layers, 1 poly layer
Instruction SRAM (icache) 16 KB (one of same sized blocks at bottom of pic - likely target)
Data SRAM 16 KB (tightly coupled data memory - located beside icache)
OTP 8 KB (maybe on top left)
boot code ROM 8 KB (maybe dual banks on top right)
Registers likely at top middle
Flash off-die
The next two chapters will provide details on the PIC16F687 and ARM Cortex-M0
LPC1114FN28102, specifically analyzing decapsulation and LFI. The decapsulation of the
RISC-V and a FPGA are also briefly examined in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Results for MicroChip PIC16F687
Although publications have generally discussed the topic of security of MCUs, attack tech-
niques are diverse and published LFI work provides few and superficial details about the
used experimental setup and methodology. This chapter contributes to state of the art
LFI by:
• providing a detailed LFI experimental setup and methodology [109,110].
• presenting a combined quiescent PEM and LFI methodology to provide exact laser
positioning and laser pulse timing for controlled fault injections.
• providing a new attack on the AES revealing the secret key after only one short laser
pulse.
In the following sections, we’ll discuss the results for both frontside and backside de-
capsulation, measurements and effects of laser pulses on a DUA and attacks performed
on that DUA.The nominal operating conditions for running different experiments are as
follows unless otherwise mentioned within a certain experiment. The DUA analyzed in this
chapter is the PIC16F687 [115] connected to a 5V supply voltage and running at 20MHz
using an external clock supplied by a waveform generator. This chapter also provides a
brief discussion of the decapsulation of two other chips, specifically the Spartan-6 FPGA
XC6SLX9 and RISC-V FE310-G002 chips.
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5.1 Frontside and backside decapsulation trials
The DUA used for initial decapsulation experiments was PIC16F687. Its package is similar
to the drawing in Figure 5.1. The black material used in manufacturing the package is
called epoxy. Pure epoxy is practically transparent with the laser at the 1064nm wavelength
[116]. The optical absorption depth of cold epoxy resin was found to be approximately
4mm [116]. However, the package is manufactured using reinforced composites of epoxy
hence impurities will burn when exposed to the laser. Thus it was necessary to remove the
packaging. Also this supported imaging of the structure of the die. The die image helped
in determining the target area either from the front or the backside for the laser spot.
The uniform pocket in the middle of the PIC, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, was required
for both frontside and backside decapsulation using a milling or a Computer Numeric
Control (CNC) machine. Regarding the frontside, the uniformity of the pocket was very
crucial so that the fuming nitric acid etches the epoxy [117] uniformly at the middle of
the packaged PIC and finally reveals the IC without dissolving the copper bonding wires.
Different types of bonding wires might require different types of chemicals in order to be
able to etch the epoxy without dissolving the bonding wires [7]. The frontside decapsulation
video produced by a hardware engineer at Google Life Sciences [118] was extremely helpful
in starting to develop a detailed decapsulation procedure. I took the technique in [118] as
the basis for the procedure that I followed hereunder after making some modifications to






Figure 5.1: Chip pocket demonstration.
The following two sub-sections provide detailed steps to decapsulate chips from both
front and backsides. Before going into the frontside decapping details, we would like to
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acknowledge both Richard Barber and Professor Peter Levine who allowed us to use the
fuming hood in their lab at University of Waterloo to carry out the chemical etching process
which involved using fuming nitric acid.
The frontside depackaging involves both mechanical drilling and chemical etching. Un-
like previous research, the details of frontside decapsulation are exposed and the procedure
for the frontside decapsulation is provided in the next subsection.
5.1.1 Frontside proposed procedure
1. Drill a pocket in the package of the DUA as shown in Figure 5.1 suitable for one
droplet (20µL) of fuming nitric acid.
2. Wear the suitable safety equipment (lab coat, apron, gloves, and protective glasses)
while using the fuming nitric acid.
3. Put the IC in a ceramic container using a metallic holder and heat the container to
100℃ using a hot plate inside a fuming hood.
4. Measure the temperature of the package of the DUA using an IR thermometer and
make sure that it reached 100℃.
5. Put a single drop of fuming nitric acid using a fine tip pipette (shown in Figure 5.2)
in the drilled pocket then wait until the acid doesn’t react anymore (i.e starts to dry
out) then put another drop of fuming nitric acid.
6. Wash or rinse the DUA with acetone to remove any residues of the removed epoxy
of the package in another ceramic container.
7. Repeat 5 and 6 until the die is clearly visible.
8. Safely dispose any resides of the fuming nitric acid, acetone, or epoxy according to
the University of Waterloo Chemicals disposal safety procedures.
Figure 5.2: Pipette used for frontside decap.
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Pocket dimensions for two DUAs are mentioned in Table 5.1. Those dimensions were
used to try different cavity sizes to improve the quality of the both the frontside and
backside decapped samples. A 1mm depth for the cavity from the frontside was adequate.
Moving down further might risk damaging the die if the cutting tool touches it or even
breaking the bonding wires through the vibrations of the rotating cutting tool at 2500
rpm (rotation per minute). More precise pocket drilling using automatic CNC machines
will lead to better chemical decap by only exposing the surface of the die with minimal
exposure of the surrounding bonding wires. This was proven to be true in subsequent trials.
Also, the dimensions mentioned in Table 5.1 were beneficial in estimating an approximate
substrate thickness which lead to guided substrate thinning/polishing process carried in
the machine shop at the University of Waterloo and at the Department of National Defence
(DND) as well.
Early frontside decapsulation trials for PIC16F687 are shown in Figure 5.3. The first
sample was totally damaged by the etching acid and wasn’t functional as well as noth-
ing of the die was barely visibly except some damaged bonding wires as shown in Fig-
ure 5.3(a). Then two samples were successfully decapped while still functional as shown in
Figure 5.3(b) and Figure 5.3(c). In the 3rd trial, four out of five samples were working.
Table 5.1: PIC pocket dimensions for different DUAs.
PIC16F1827 PIC16F687
Original packaging thickness 3.28mm 3.31mm
Depth of pocket (frontside) 1511µm 1511µm
Depth of pocket (backside) 1397µm 1397µm
Width of the die 2.4mm 2.0mm
Length of the die 3.2mm 2.2mm
Since the VMU couldn’t capture the whole area of the frontside of the decapped chip
in one shot, individual images were captured as shown in Figure 5.4 then stitched together
using a software program [119] offered by Microsoft Research. Figure 5.5 shows the whole






Figure 5.3: Unsuccessful frontside decapsulation trial in (a) and successful trials in (b) and
(c). One of the samples was programmed and tested as shown in (d) and (e).
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Figure 5.4: Individual frontside images for part of the PIC16F687 chip from using the
CCD NIR camera. Captured 8 overlapping images of different parts of the de-packaged
PIC16F687 using the 5X NIR objective.
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Figure 5.5: Stitched image of the whole frontside decapped PIC16F687 chip.
Figure 5.6: Frontside decapped PIC16F687 with M Plan APO NIR 5X and 50X objectives.
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However, residues of the dissolved epoxy remained on the decapped chip and introduced
a fire-hazard risk if exposed to the laser as well as obstructing the visibility of the structure
of the die as shown in Figure 5.5. In the 4th trial, while trying to improve the decapsulation
technique, only one of five samples was functional with failure of removing the residues
of the epoxy. It has been noticed that applying acetone through the nozzle at a higher
pressure leads to removing epoxy residues as shown in Figure 5.7. An ultrasonic acetone
path might not result in the central spot shown in Figure 5.7 (to be discovered).
Figure 5.7: Clean sample of frontside decapped PIC16F687 with an acetone footprint in
the center probably due to high pressure.
When the same frontside decapsulation procedure mentioned in section 5.1.1 was con-
ducted on PIC16F1827 several times, the bonding wires always disappeared as shown in
Figure 5.8 and green vapors appeared, most probably, while the fuming nitric acid was
etching away the bonding wires. According to [7], bonding wires made of different materi-
als require specific chemicals to avoid dissolving the bonding wires while etching away the
epoxy. As a future work, we’ll confirm the material of the bonding wire of PIC16F1827
which is suspected to be silver since the silver is dissolved when exposed to fuming nitric
acid.
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Figure 5.8: Bonding wires of the front side decapsulated PIC16F1827 chip were dissolved
during the chemical etching process. Different chemicals may be needed to etch the epoxy
without dissolving the bonding wires made of a material other than copper according to [7].
5.1.2 Backside proposed procedure:
The backside depackaging, unlike the frontside, is only mechanical and doesn’t involve
any etching chemicals. Unlike previous research, the details of decapsulation are exposed
below. The procedure for the backside decapsulation is listed in the following steps:
1. Drill a pocket in the backside of the DUA’s package till the copper shield is visible.
2. Locate the two narrow copper connections at two side of the copper shield and cut
those connections.
3. Remove the copper shield. The copper is glued to the substrate so use a small plastic
tool and some lens cleaning liquid to remove the remaining glue till you have a shiny
substrate surface.
4. Perform substrate thinning if needed. If the laser isn’t powerful enough, substrate
thinning will be required.
5. Do polishing to get clean structural image of the IC using the SWIR camera.
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The captured images of the DUA shown in Figure 5.9 were drilled using milling ma-
chines (controlled manually) in the student machine shop at University of Waterloo. CNC
machines can provide better accuracy and automation of the drilling operation. An in-
house desktop CNC machine [120] will allow greater flexibility in performing drilling and
polishing for future decapped samples. The whole stitched and mirrored image of the
backside is shown in Figure 5.9(d). The image was mirrored to be able to compare the
structured components to those in the frontside captured view.
Also a Spartan-6 FPGA XC6SLX9 and a RISC-V ASIC were backside decapsulated as
shown in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 respectively. The thickness of the FPGA is smaller
than that of the PIC MCU and the process of fastening the DUA while drilling from the
backside was challenging in case of the FPGA. Beside that, the same steps mentioned for
the PIC MCU were followed to decap the FPGA from the backside as well. The decapped
Spartan-6 FPGA is shown in Figure 5.10a.
The SWIR camera, mentioned in subsection 5.1.2 in the last step in the backside
decapsulation procedure, was used to capture the images from the backside. Details about




Figure 5.9: Backside decapped chip at different stages (a) before getting to the copper
shield, (b) With the copper shield should the attached ends, (c) Without the copper shield
and (d) SWIR image of the backside decapped PIC16F687 chip.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.10: (a) Backside of the decapsulated Spartan-6 FPGA and (b) its unaltered
frontside.
Figure 5.11: RISC-V FE310-G002 backside decapsulated chip with both frontside and
backside before decapsulation.
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5.2 Laser pulse measurements and characterization
Some experiments needed to be performed in order to tailor the energy of the laser pulse
(width and amplitude) as well as the timing of the laser pulse so that it hits the DUA in
the appropriate clock cycle to induce a current that successfully injects a fault. The delay
between the external clock and the instruction clock (output pin of DUA) is depicted in
Figure 5.12a. Figure 5.12b shows the delay between the instruction that triggers the laser
and the appearance of the laser pulse from the APD output.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.12: a) Clock-to-instruction cycle delay and b) Instruction cycle to laser pulse




5.2.1 Induced and switching currents
A Rohde & Schwarz RS H 2.5-2 H-field probe, connected to the oscilloscope, was placed
on the VDD pin of the DUA (shown in Figure 5.13) to analyze the effect of the laser pulse
on the current drawn by the DUA. Figure 5.14a shows that there is a peak in the drawn
current representing the induced current as a result of the injected laser pulse. On the
other hand, Figure 5.14b shows the expected switching-current due to an I/O pin toggle.
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Figure 5.13: Rohde & Schwarz RS H 2.5-2 H-field probe [8] placed on the VDD pin, as
shown on the right hand side.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.14: a) Induced current (purple) due to laser pulse (green), 200ns at 50% peak
current, where the H-field probe is connected to CH3; and CH4 is connected to APD.b)
Switching current (purple) due to triggering of the MCU where the H-field probe is con-
nected to CH3; and CH4 is connected to trigger I/O pin (green).
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5.3 Introduction to PIC16F687
The PIC16F687 [9] applies a 2-stage pipeline with a Harvard structure. The two-stage
instruction pipeline overlaps the fetch and execution of instructions. It has a 3.5KB Flash
program memory and 384 bytes data memories divided into 128 bytes SRAM and 256 bytes
EEPROM. It has 14 configuration bits. The program memory code protection and data
memory code protection are two special configuration bits that can be used to enable/dis-
able reading program code from Flash memory or data code from EEPROM respectively.
The data memory and the program memory have separate buses. The only available reg-
ister in the data path is the working register (Wreg). Each instruction is a 14-bit word
which gets fetched in one instruction cycle then executed in the next instruction cycle
in the 2-stage pipeline. The instruction set has only 35 instructions. All instruction are
executed in a single cycle except for branches. Each instruction cycle (fetch or execute) is
divided in four Q cycles as shown in timing diagram in Figure 5.15. The Q cycles provide
the timing/designation for the Decode, Read, Process Data, Write etc., of each instruction
cycle. Q1 is used for decoding the instruction in the fetching phase or a forced no oper-
ation (NOP) in the execution phase. Q2, Q3, and Q4 are used for a read-modify-write
procedure. Specifically, Q2 is for instruction read or NOP, Q3 to process the data and Q4
for instruction write or NOP [9].







4.2  Clocking Scheme/Instruction Cycle
The clock input (from OSC1) is internally divided by four to generate four non-overlapping
quadrature clocks, namely Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. Internally, the program counter (PC) is incre-
mented every Q1, and the instruction is fetched from the program memory and latched into the
instruction register in Q4. The instruction is decoded and executed during the following Q1
through Q4. The clocks and instruction execution flow are illustrated in Figure 4-3, and
Example 4-1.
Figure 4-3: Clock/Instruction Cycle         











Execute INST (PC-1) Fetch INST (PC+1)






Figure 5.15: Fetch and execute timing diagram [9] for the two-stage pipelined DUA where
the fetch and execution of instructions overlaps.
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5.4 Attacks on PIC16F687
LFI experiments focused on the output from the flash memory, programming of config-
uration bits and attacking AES-128. The output of the flash will be referred to as the
instruction register (Ireg).
Figure 5.16: Laser beam spot target location captured using the NIR camera at 1.5% peak
current near the Ireg.
Navigating the correct area to attack to achieve a successful intended attack could be
a real challenge so the ability to identify different structures from the backside of the a
decapsulated chip was very beneficial in reducing the time needed to find the sweet spot
for a specific attack. For example, while sweeping across the DUA, some areas did not
introduce any noticeable faulty behavior letting the chip run normally whereas other areas
halted the chip when the laser pulse energy was increased.
Different types of attacks were performed on the DUA and will be explained in the
following subsections. All the performed attacks proved to be repeatable under the same
operating conditions. Unless otherwise stated the experimental settings involved one laser
channel (with specified laser pulse width and percentage of laser peak current), 5X ob-
jective, and the PIC operated at 20MHz, 5V. In all cases the laser was triggered within
the test program. All the attacks targeted the laser beam spot at the location depicted in
Figure 5.16 unless otherwise mentioned in a certain experiment.
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5.4.1 Instruction skip attack
In this attack, an arbitrary number of instructions were skipped depending on a tailored
laser pulse whose laser peak current and laser pulse width were varied. The area of interest
in this type of attack was the 14-bit flash read sensors as shown in Figure 4.12. The key
concept here is to find the exact laser pulse energy (peak current and pulse width) needed
to skip an arbitrary number of instructions without introducing any other faults to the
executed instructions. This resembles replacing those skipped instructions with NOPs
instructions. Examples of the skipped instructions are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Effect of the laser source peak current on the number of skipped instructions
for a 200ns laser pulse width.
Number of
skipped instructions












1 31.25 andlw 0xFE




1 33.75 goto $
The assembly program that was written to test and verify the instruction skipping
started by filling 96 bytes of the general purpose registers in the SRAM of the DUA with a
certain known value (0xAA for example). It then performs some operations whose results
are stored to chosen addresses. The stored result(s) should change if a fault is successfully
injected. For example, the laser parameters required to skip one or more of the four
successive instructions, addlw 0x01 that increments the value of the Wreg [9], are shown
in Table 5.2 to get a total count less than four. The laser spot was targeted towards the
location shown in Figure 5.16.
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5.4.2 Instruction replacement attack
This attack is the generic form of the instruction skip attack where one or more of the
executed instructions can be replaced by another instruction including the NOP. We focus
on providing examples of replaced instructions other than the NOP (since replacing the
instructions with NOP was illustrated in subsection 5.4.1). It should be noted that when
a laser pulse with sufficient energy is applied to a certain viable target area of the DUA,
a certain number of instructions could be skipped. However if the laser pulse energy is
a little bit more or a little bit less than the sufficient energy to skip a whole (integer)
number of instructions, the last instruction to be faulted is replaced by a faulty non-NOP
instruction. The faulty instruction value appears to be dependent on the energy of the
injected laser pulse, target area location and the hamming weight of the original 14-bit
instruction which was supposed to be executed if there was no LFI. A simple example
of instruction replacement is altering the immediate value being added to the Wreg [9]
(i.e. adding 0x02 to the Wreg instead of 0x01 by replacing addlw 0x01 with addlw 0x02).
For example, due to the PEM results detailed in section 5.4.5 the immediate value of the
instruction was located in the region of the laser pulse providing further evidence of fault
injection causing the immediate value change. Since the PEM was a separate station (both
LFI and PEM setups are described in sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively), it was not
possible to inject a fault and carry the device over to the PEM to analyze the photon
emissions or changes to the instruction. Thus based upon the test program and PEM
identification of the instruction fields, the addlw 0x01 instruction could be changed to two
different values when targeting the beam at two different locations along Ireg using a (50ns,
34.625% peak current) pulse. Figure 5.16 shows one location of the beam to change addlw
0x01 to addlw 0x81 (one MSB changed in the immediate value) while Figure 5.17 depicts
a different location of the beam to change addlw 0x01 to addlw 0xC1 (two MSBs changed
in the immediate value).
It was also observed that two properly tailored laser pulses could produce the same
faulty instruction. For example, a laser pulse with width 100ns with 17% of the peak
current injected the same fault as a 200ns pulse with 9.375% of the peak current when
targeting a certain location with nominal operating conditions.
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Figure 5.17: Laser beam spot target location captured using the NIR camera for a (50ns,
34.625% peak current) near the Ireg to alter the immediate value in addlw 0x01.
5.4.3 Configuration bits attack
One of the interesting attacks performed on the DUA was the successful skipping of the
configuration bits (EEPROM) programming while flashing the DUA. The MCU was run-
ning at 20MHz so the instruction cycle was 5MHz and the laser was triggered only during
the programming session then switched off. The laser spot was targeted over the center of
the configuration bits area. The configuration bits area is annotated in Figure 4.12. The
pulsed laser was configured to have a 100ns pulse width with a 500mA peak current at a
5MHz frequency (which is the same as the instruction cycle frequency for this attack to be
successful) during the programming session of the DUA. After the programming session
was completed, the laser was turned off. We wrote a simple assembly program to a write
a certain value in the SRAM then several instructions were executed repeatedly to read,
increment and store the value at the same SRAM location. The final value was written
to EEPROM. The attack was as follows: when the laser was turned on during the pro-
gramming session of the DUA while downloading an assembly program that enables code
protection on DUA with code protection originally disabled (e.g. config bits = 0x33F7), it
was found that config bits were not changed as the user intended to enable the code pro-
tection (e.g. using config bits = 0x3337) and the code was successfully read (i.e. the config
bits remained as 0x33F7). When the same experiment was done with the laser turned off,
the code protection was enabled and the code was not readable from the DUA because the
new config bits were successfully changed to 0x3337.
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5.4.4 AES-128 key retrieval
This section presents an attack [109, 110] that was conducted on the full assembly imple-
mentation of AES-128, provided by Microchip, while running on the DUA. The laser is
triggered by adding two port set/clear instructions (BSF,BCF ) before the target instruc-
tion (decfsz ) as shown in the code in column 1 of Table 5.3. Table 5.3 focuses on the critical
section in the assembly code where the laser source gets triggered to skip a certain target
instruction (decfsz in this case). Also, Table 5.3 shows the number of clock cycles supplied
by the external clock source needed to reach a certain Q cycle for a certain corresponding
instruction either in the fetch or the execute stage of that instruction.
Round 0 F7 9C 84 8B FE 1C B4 F7
F1 52 EE 80 92 DD 99 17
45 E3 A6 2C 84 93 B7 AE
1D C0 51 DB FA 41 59 0B
Round 1 68 DE 5F 3D 68 DE 5F 3D 4D 0A 26 42 42 19 81 12 0F 13 A7 50 01
A1 00 28 CD 00 28 CD A1 BD B9 D6 86 CB 12 E4 A3 76 AB 32 25
6E 11 24 71 24 71 6E 11 F0 E3 9B D6 5F DF 10 F3 AF 3C 8B 25
A4 BA D1 B9 B9 A4 BA D1 F5 73 2D 4E 67 A0 A7 CF 92 D3 8A 81
Round 10 2A D9 31 2D 2A D9 31 2D AE BC 40 F4 84 65 71 D9 36
E3 81 50 C5 81 50 C5 E3 D3 B2 F2 85 52 E2 37 66
7A 6A EC E4 EC E4 7A 6A E1 6A 14 44 0D 8E 6E 2E
A9 10 67 29 29 A9 10 67 D0 BE FD 72 F9 17 ED 15
Round 11 E4 65 09 BF E4 65 09 BF 3F DB C6 A9 DB BE CF 16 6C
66 37 89 97 37 89 97 66 54 08 21 B6 63 81 B6 D0
F8 02 FA 1B FA 1B F8 02 AE C1 4C 98 54 DA B4 9A
70 AE 54 40 40 70 AE 54 8C AB 98 77 CC DB 36 23
SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns AddRoundKey Key Schedule Round Constant
Figure 5.18: AES-128 internals showing the 1st round till the 11th round where the 10th
round check (decfsz round counter,f ) is skipped to add an additional 11th no-mix-column
round.
We used the known-plaintext attack (KPA) model for cryptanalysis. Two different
attacks were conducted by targeting two different instructions: xorwf and decfsz. The 1st
attack skips the xorwf instruction (using laser pulse width 200ns and 9% percent of peak
laser current) to extract a single byte out of the 16-byte key at a time, then repeating this to
obtain the remaining 15 bytes of the key which is similar to [121] but using 16 short pulses to
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skip the xorwf instruction instead of a very long pulse to skip the whole 16-byte key addition
in the 10th round. The 2nd attack skips the decfsz instruction (using laser pulse width 200ns
and 9% percent of peak laser current) to add one more extra round with no mix-columns
(11th round). This attack retrieves the whole 16-byte using a single fault injection. The
later attack method is easier and more efficient and has been verified by generating 100
random generated keys, plain-text and cipher-text pairs. Figure 5.18 shows an example
of the latter attack where the used plain-text was 0x0963c1e7808f7081307711087c9782d0.
The target location in this attack is shown in Figure 5.16.
In order to provide a formal proof for our new attack on AES-128 , let M denote the
plain-text, K denote the AES key, Ki denote the ith AES round key, C denote the correct
cipher-text, M i denote the temporary cipher result after the ith round and D denote a
faulty cipher-text. Each round is composed of 4 transformations: SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns and a bit-per-bit XOR with a round key. The final 10th round of the AES
is composed of the same functions as a classical round except that it does not include the
MixColumns transformation as thoroughly explained in [30].
Without LFI the attacker can get C mentioned in equation 5.1 using KPA and with LFI
one more additional 11th round is executed that does not include the MixColumns similar
to the 10th round and the attacker gets D as mentioned in equation 5.2. Equation 5.3
below shows how the attacker uses D and C to get the round key K11. It is well known
that by reversing the Rijndael’s key schedule starting by K11, the whole 16-byte key could
be retrieved.
C = ShiftRows(SubBytes(M9))⊕K10 (5.1)
D = ShiftRows(SubBytes(C))⊕K11 (5.2)
D ⊕ ShiftRows(SubBytes(C)) = K11 (5.3)
5.4.5 Instruction register PEM analysis
The SWIR camera and the waveform generator were the main tools used to analyze the Ireg
(more specifically trying to locate the instruction register on the backside of the die). The
external clock is internally divided by four to generate four non-overlapping quadrature
clocks, namely Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. Internally, the program counter (PC) is incremented
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Table 5.3: Injecting arbitrary number of clock cycles to reach the end of a certain Q cycle
for a desired assembly instruction.
Instruction Q4execute Q1fetch Q2fetch Q3fetch
BSF PORTC,RC4 23641 23634 23635 23636
BCF PORTC,RC4 23645 23638 23639 23640
NOP 23649 23642 23643 23644
decfsz round counter,f 23653 23646 23647 23648
every Q1, and the instruction is fetched from the program memory and latched into the
Ireg in Q4 [9]. The instruction is decoded and executed during the following Q1 through





























Figure 5.19: At normal operating conditions without any over-voltaging (VDD = 5V) for
(decfsz 0x44,f ) instruction (14-bit instruction word = 0b00101111000100 ) a) Ireg emissions
and b) ADU graph where the ADU values correspond to the emissions intensity along the
Ireg.
The laser pulse target location for AES was believed to be close to the middle of the Ireg.
Different locations along the Ireg were investigated and successful fault injection occurred
with different laser pulse amplitudes at different locations. When moving away from the
Ireg, no faults were injected.
A fixed number of clock cycles are launched, after which the clock is switched off to
78
Figure 5.20: Ireg emissions for (incf 0x44,f ) instruction (opcode = 0b00101011000100 ) at
VDD = 10.5V.
capture a quiescent PEM image at the flash memory output of DUA. After the image is
collected, the clock is injected again continuously to output data for analysis. Different
emission intensities are shown in Figure 5.19a and 5.20 by varying the supply voltage.
The emissions are only visible when stopping the external clock at the end of Q1fetch and
Q2fetch (not the execution). At the end of Q3fetch , the emissions for the instruction being
fetched disappear as likely the 14-bit instruction word will have been latched to the control
circuitry beside the Ireg. The laser pulse effect (i.e. induced current) has to target Q3 in
the fetching phase of the target instruction (clock cycle# 23648 as mentioned in Table 5.3)
to have an effect on a target instruction. For example, if the execution of the program is
stopped at Q1fetch/Q2fetch of the target instruction (Itarget) with the laser being triggered
to inject the pulse during Q1fetch/Q2fetch , the fault injection would be unsuccessful. On the
other hand, if the execution of the program is stopped at the end of Q3fetch (clock cycle#
23648 as mentioned in Table 5.3) of Itarget, the effect of the transient induced current due
to the laser pulse would have already been captured by the control circuitry beside the Ireg
and the fault would be injected.
The quiescent (static) emissions of the Ireg could be captured within a 3 seconds inte-
gration time under the normal power supply (5V) as shown in Figure 5.19a. Figure 5.20
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illustrates emissions from a different instruction again showing correct opcode readout, but
using a higher 10.5V supply. The over-voltaging achieves higher intensities of emissions
but as shown in Figure 5.19a over-voltaging is not necessary. By increasing the integration
time of the SWIR camera (instead of increasing the supply voltage) we could capture more
of those emitted photons from the Ireg. The intensity values of the emissions captured by
the SWIR camera are shown in Figure 5.19b and are clearly correlated with the 14-bit
decfsz 0x44,f instruction, whose value was 0b00101111000100.
5.5 Countermeasures
Without a complete understanding of the FI impact on the MCU, countermeasures for
FI attacks cannot be developed. However, any countermeasure comes at a price. For
example, software countermeasures usually affect the performance because of added code
overhead while hardware countermeasures usually increase the manufacturing cost. For
example countermeasures were suggested for single-bit data corruption, although FI has
also demonstrated multi-bit corruptions [122]. In addition, instruction skipping counter-
measures were also developed, such as duplication in [123], although research also shows
evidence of instruction replacement faults [124]. Software countermeasures such as dupli-
cation in [123] aren’t effective against LFI since one or more instruction could be skipped
using a customized LFI pulse as discussed in sub-section 5.4.1.
In this section, we discuss several LFI countermeasures specific to PIC16F687 but may
be applied to similar targets. Also general physical and software countermeasures are
discussed.
5.5.1 Configuration bits factory protection
Since the factory settings of the PIC16F687 chip is that the code protection is disabled, the
user will want to enable the code protection when downloading on the DUA. Therefore,
having the code protection enabled as a factory default setting would be a countermea-
sure against the attack that leads to skipping the programming of the configuration bits
mentioned in sub-section 5.4.3.
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5.5.2 Encrypted instruction set and dummy structures
Encrypting the instruction set will obfuscate both instruction alteration using LFI and
instruction readout using PEM. In general the key could be implemented using fuses or as
a PUF. The countermeasure can be thwarted if the attacker can determine the encryption
key of the instruction set. Dummy structures may be added to the chip layout to mislead
the attacker at the expense of some area/power overhead.
5.5.3 Thicker substrate to obstruct PEM
A thicker substrate will obstruct PEM and mandate a substrate thinning process which
leads to a more complex sample preparation procedure by adding a thinning step during
which the DUA might be damaged thus increasing the complexity of attack. Technology
scaling tend mandate thicker substrates because of the increased wafer size [125] thus acts
as a countermeasure for PEM.
5.5.4 Hardfault
Implementing an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) that gets triggered when an invalid in-
struction, caused through LFI, enters the execution pipeline may be a valuable counter-
measure instead of execution of a NOP which leads to a successful instruction-skip attack.
For example, this type of ISR is referred to as a hardfault for a DUA like ARM Cortex-M0
LPC1114FN28102 which will be discussed in chapter 6.
5.5.5 Latchup
Countermeasures could involve a custom doping to the substrate and wells (either N or P)
such that the substrate’s sensitivity to latch-up increases against LFI.
5.5.6 Bulk current sensor and substrate coating
Sensors in the substrate [126] could be used to detect any current injected through LFI.
In addition, the substrate can be coated with an optically active layer [73] that reflects
the light emitted by the operation of forward-biased p-n junctions, which are considered as
LEDs.The LEDs light can detected by depleted areas like reverse p-n junctions, which are
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considered photocurrent detectors.The backside protection layer provides angle dependent
reflection and full transmission blocking so any damage in this protection layer will affect
the angle of reflection for one or more of the LED light beams to be detected by the
photodetectors. Therefore, the detected photocurrent can be used to verify the integrity
of the backside protection layer and detect attacks.
It is also important to note that software countermeasures such as instruction duplica-
tion and error detecting/correcting codes have to take into account the multiple instruction
skip attack; otherwise those countermeasures will be ineffective against LFI. Also, the area
overhead for active devices to detect the laser induced current would also introduce in-
creased energy consumption which is considered an important metric and limitation for
low-power IoT devices.
5.6 Summary and comparison with previous research
Despite numerous publications in fault injection, laser fault injection methodologies remain
diverse with limited details on equipment and setups. A new laser fault injection method-
ology is proposed which combines quiescent photon emissions with backside dynamic laser
pulse profiling in time and space. Empirical results illustrate the impact of the laser on
multiple-instruction fault injections, and controlled instruction replacement faults. Further
details of comparative previous research is provided below.
LFI was introduced in 2002 by S. Skorobogatov and R. Anderson [29]. Several publica-
tions [18, 53, 90, 127] confirmed the local and temporal precision of LFI. Breier et al. [121]
discussed the use of the laser pulse (glitch) to skip an arbitrary number of instructions
executing on a 0.35µm ATmega328P. The laser beam was injected on the backside of the
die at a single location found from scanning the entire die region (without die imaging).
For example their attack on AES used one very long single laser pulse of 3µsec to skip
the whole last round key addition for the 16-bytes. SEM imaging was combined with LFI
in [128], to reduce the complexity of finding laser targets or flipflops on a 25MHz 90nm
AES chip. Attacks using LFI on processors have also been empirically demonstrated how-
ever the target was data in the RAM blocks in the PIC16F84 and ATmega [129], or in
the flipflops [127, 128]. Other LFI research such as [124] attacked the ChaCHa20 cipher
executing on the ATmega328p. The fault injection attacks largely skipped instructions,
with the exception of one attack which replaced addition instructions with subtraction
instructions as mentioned in [124]. Other researchers have demonstrated an attack on the
secure boot using static LFI [130]. This attack utilized a Quadcore A9 running at 1.4GHz
and focused on using very long pulse widths and large spot size to flip bits in configuration
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registers. Roscian et al. [48] simulated the effect of the laser pulse on the DUA. LFI attack
of a physical unclonable function was aided by PEM, FIB and Laser scanning microscope
images to identify the location of the ring-oscillators and inverter chains on a complex
programmable logic device [122]. However, the attack focused on changing the configura-
tion bits in the lookup tables and utilized extremely expensive PHEMOS1000 equipment.
In [123], the authors proposed a software countermeasure based on a fault model in which
the attacker is able to skip a single assembly instruction. The single assembly instruction
skip fault model has been observed on several architectures. Limited research has exam-
ined the analysis of dynamic LFI on processors utilizing quiescent photon emissions. In
addition, there is limited analysis of the impact of laser parameter variations in time and
space including pulse width and intensity variation effects on instruction fetches.
Unlike previous research, the results presented in this chapter show that quiescent pho-
ton emissions combined with laser fault injection provides fine tuning of faulty instructions
in addition to reverse engineering within each clock cycle.
In the next chapter, a DUA, specifically ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 supplied




Results for ARM Cortex-M0
LPC1114FN28102
This section describes the attack procedure and LFI results on the ARM Cortex-M0 chip.
The attack procedure differs from that used in the previous chapter due to challenges with
imaging the backside of the ARM using the laser Mitutoyo equipment setup. Results of
PEM and a discussion of countermeasures is also covered.
6.1 Introduction to ARM Cortex-M0
The ARM Cortex-M0 processor is a 32-bit RISC processor, with a 3-stage (fetch, decode
and execution) pipeline von-Neumann (load-store) architecture with a single bus inter-
face. Basic specifications of LPC1114FN28102 are show in Table 4.2. The Cortex-M0 (for
MCUs and ASICs) processor implements the ARMv6-M architecture (same architecture
for Cortex-M1 used in FPGAs), which is based on the 16-bit Thumb instruction set and
includes Thumb-2 technology (16-bit and 32-bit instructions). The ARMv6-M architec-
ture inherits attractive features from various ARM architectures as shown in 6.1 which
implies that attacks against the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 could be likely suc-
cessful against other Cortex-based MCUs. The 32-bit instructions are used when the 16-bit
version can’t carry out the required operations. This provides the exceptional performance
expected of a modern 32-bit architecture, with a higher code density than other 8-bit
and 16-bit MCUs and avoids the overhead of switching between two instruction sets. In
total, the Cortex-M0 supports only 56 base instructions with some instructions having
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more than one form. The ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 instruction set has forward
compatibility with the ARM Cortex-M3/M4.
This development results in a processor architecture that is very small and efficient and yet is
easy to use and can achieve a high performance. Similar to the Cortex-M3 processor, both the
Cortex-M0 and the Cortex-M1 processors include a nested vectored interrupt controller
(NVIC) and use the same exception/interrupt mechanism. They also use a programmer’s mode
similar to ARMv7-M, which defines Thread mode and Exception mode (Figure 1.5). They also
support the CoreSight Debug architecture, which makes it easy for users to develop and test
applications.
The rest of the book will only focus on the Cortex-M0 processor and not the Cortex-M1
processor.
ARM Processors and the ARM Ecosystem
What makes the ARM architecture special compared to proprietary architectures? Aside from
the processor technology, the ecosystem surrounding ARM development plays a very
important role.
As well as working directly with the microcontroller vendors that offer ARM processor-based
devices, ARM works closely with vendors that provide the ecosystem supporting those
devices. These include vendors providing compilers, middleware, operating systems, and
development tools, as well as training and design services companies, distributors, academic





























ARMv6-M architecture provides attractive features from various ARM architectures.
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Figure 6.1: ARMv6-M inherits attractive features from various ARM architectures [10].
The ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 processor core (12K gate count at minimum
configuration) has register bank, Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU), data path and control logic.
The register bank has sixteen 32-bit registers (some of them are special registers). The
data path and Advanced High-Performance Bus (AHB) are 32-bit wide. The addresses are
linear and 32-bit with no memory paging. The processor has two modes: Thread(normal
execution) mode and Handler (exception and interrupts) mode. The Nested Vectored Inter-
rupt Controller (NVIC) su ports up to 32 int rrupt requests and a nonmaskable interrupt
(NMI) input. If the interrupt is acc pted by the processor according to the interrupt’s
priority level, the processor responds (minimum in 16 clock cycles but configurable) by
executing the corresponding interrupt handler. For example, in Cortex-M0 programming
the data variables stored in memory need to be stored at an address location that is a mul-
tiple of its size otherwise a hardfault will occur. Another reason to trigger the hardfault
handler is a cleared Thumb-bit (it should always be set to indicate that ARM Cortex-
M0 LPC1114FN28102 is executing Thumb instructions only) in the xPSR register. If the
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T (Thumb) bit is cleared in the xPSR Register, then the hardfault was caused by an
accidental switching to ARM state.
The Hardfault is one of the interrupts. Interrupts have seven priority levels: three fixed
and four programmable. Under normal situations, the interrupt latency of the Cortex-M0
processor is 16 cycles. The interrupt latency is defined as from the processor clock cycle the
interrupt is asserted, to the start of the execution of the interrupt handler. This interrupt
latency assumes the following:
• The interrupt is enabled and is not masked by PRIMASK or other executing excep-
tion handlers.
• The memory system does not have any wait state. If the memory system has wait
state, the interrupt could be delayed by wait states that occur at the last bus transfer
before interrupt processing, stacking, vector fetch, or instruction fetch at the start of
the interrupt handler.
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Sufficient priority means the exception has greater priority than any limit set by the mask 
register, see Section 28–28.4.1.3.6. An exception with less priority than this is pending but 
is not handled by the processor.
When the processor takes an exception, unless the exception is a tail-chained or a 
late-arriving exception, the processor pushes information onto the current stack. This 
operation is referred to as stacking and the structure of eight data words is referred as a 
stack frame. The stack frame contains the following information:
 
Immediately after stacking, the stack pointer indicates the lowest address in the stack 
frame. The stack frame is aligned to a double-word address.
The stack frame includes the return address. This is the address of the next instruction in 
the interrupted program. This value is restored to the PC at exception return so that the 
interrupted program resumes.
The processor performs a vector fetch that reads the exception handler start address from 
the vector table. When stacking is complete, the processor starts executing the exception 
handler. At the same time, the processor writes an EXC_RETURN value to the LR. This 
indicates which stack pointer corresponds to the stack frame and what operation mode 
the processor was in before the entry occurred.
If no higher priority exception occurs during exception entry, the processor starts 
executing the exception handler and automatically changes the status of the 
corresponding pending interrupt to active. 
If another higher priority exception occurs during exception entry, the processor starts 
executing the exception handler for this exception and does not change the pending 
status of the earlier exception. This is the late arrival case.
28.4.3.6.2 Exception return
Exception return occurs when the processor is in Handler mode and execution of one of 
the following instructions attempts to set the PC to an EXC_RETURN value:
• a POP instruction that loads the PC
• a BX instruction using any register.
The processor saves an EXC_RETURN value to the LR on exception entry. The 
exception mechanism relies on this value to detect when the processor has completed an 
exception handler. Bits[31:4] of an EXC_RETURN value are 0xFFFFFFF. When the 
processor loads a value matching this pattern to the PC it detects that the operation is a 
Fig 102. Exception entry stack contentsFigure 6.2: ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114 stack frame.
On the Cortex-M0 processor, there is only one exception type that handles faults: the
hardfault handler. The hardfault handler is almost the highest priority exception type,
with a priority level of -1. Only the NMI can preempt it. When it is executed, we know
that the MCU is in trouble and corrective action is needed. The hardfault handler is
also useful for debugging during the software development stage. When a breakpoint has
been set in the hardfault handler, the program execution stops when a fault occurs. By
examining the content of the stack frame shown in Figure 6.2, we can trace back to the
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location of the fault and try to identify the reason for the failure. This behavior is very
different from that of most 8-bit and 16-bit MCUs. In these MCUs, often the only safety
net is a watchdog timer. However, it takes time for a watchdog timer to be triggered, and
often there is no way to tell how the program went wrong.
6.2 Attacking procedure
First the DUA was backside decapsulated as shown in Figure 6.3a using the same procedure
for the PIC16F687 mentioned in subsection 5.1.2. The DUA was investigated under the
Mitutoyo setup in order to be able identify uniform structures such as memories in order
to make the attack easier by not having to scan the whole die area for sensitive locations
for LFI. Backside imaging of LPC1114FN28102 wasn’t straightforward as in the case of
PIC16F687. Figure 6.4a shows how the LPC1114FN28102 looked under the best achiev-
able backside imaging conditions with the SWIR camera. The NIR camera wasn’t able to
capture any structure beneath the substrate for the LPC1114FN28102. The settings used
for getting a backside image for LPC1114FN28102 are shown in Figure 6.4b. The auto-
matic dynamic range that was used in case of PIC16F687 yielded no image beneath the
substrate surface of the LPC1114FN28102. Therefore, the dynamic range was manually ad-
justed until an image with identifiable structure could be captured. However, Figure 6.4a
is still of a lower quality when compared to Figure 6.3b which was captured under the
Olympus setup. This is probably due to the thicker substrate of the LPC1114FN28102
and the transmission efficiency of the VMU. The Olympus setup has higher transmission
efficiency(> 80%) for the 1064nm wavelength than that of the Mitutoyo setup (54%). That
efficiency increase is probably mainly due to that the Mitutoyo VMU has two paths (cam-
era and laser ports) for the transmitted photons while only one path (camera only) in case
Olympus setup. Therefore, in order to make use of the more interpretable image captured
from the Olympus setup while attacking the DUA under the Mitutoyo setup, a grid similar
to the coordinate system of the XY-stage was superimposed as shown in Figure 6.5. Using
that superimposed grid avoided the difficulty of researching totally blind attacks. The grid
in Figure 6.5 represents the coordinates of the XY-stage normalized by 1000 (i.e. 0 to
55,000 in the X direction corresponds to 0 to 2.2mm and 0 to 50,000 in the Y direction
corresponds to 0 to 2mm while interpolating the values in the mentioned ranges). Also,
dividing the die into four quads as shown in Figure 6.3b made it easier to attack structures
that weren’t identified at first glance.
The Mitutoyo setup in [109, 110] was re-used while only changing the DUA. The






Figure 6.3: ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28 a)backside decapsulated chip and b) backside
image using SWIR Olympus.
ing one laser channel wasn’t enough to successfully inject faults in different regions of the
LPC1114FN28102 die (only the upper and lower right quads shown in Figure 6.3b were
susceptible to successful LFI). Therefore, the test program and the PCB connections were
modified in order to trigger both laser channels. When both channels were enabled, the
bottom left quadrant shown in Figure 6.3b became susceptible to successful LFI. The up-
per left quadrant shown in Figure 6.3b only became susceptible to successful LFI when the
50X objective was used most probably due to the increased power intensity. The beam
spot size was measured at 1.75% of the peak current with only one laser channel (CH1)
turned on to be around 40µm and 4µm using the image acquired with 5X and 50X objec-
tives respectively as shown in Figure 6.6. The 50X objective used was the Mitutoyo 50X
M Plan Apo NIR objective. Also it’s worth mentioning that when we tried to use the 50X
objective early in the experiments, we were not able to capture the laser beam spot neither
using SWIR nor the NIR camera. There was no recognizable circular illumination like
the one shown in Figure 6.6b. We found that depending upon the silicon substrate surface
smoothness the attacker may not see the spot size due to reflectance if the polishing quality
was not good enough. Details about how different regions were susceptible to successful
LFI will be further discussed in this chapter.
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It might be worth mentioning that the second laser channel of AplhaNov PDM+ did
not provide the same amount of power as the first channel. Also other laser parameters
weren’t identical. Details about both laser channels can be found in Appendix A.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.4: a) ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 backside image using SWIR camera







































































































































































Figure 6.5: Superimposed grid on the ARM Cortex-M0 backside captured using SWIR
camera under the Olympus setup.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: Laser beam spot with 1.75% laser intensity at the bottom left corner of the
ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 using a) 5X and b) 50X objectives.
6.2.1 LFI firmware
The DUA was programmed with a firmware written in a way to target the manipulation
of the decoded instructions coming out of the Flash memory. The firmware was written in
assembly to ensure the correct timing of the laser pulse relative to the target instruction.
The pseudo-code of the firmware is shown in Listing 6.1. In all code listings in this chapter,
the text after the “;” symbol is a comment and the “...” denote that the instruction is
repeated a number of times as noted in the comment. The firmware starts by properly
initializing the DUA to ensure proper operation and the clock signal is supplied by an
external wave generator. The system initialization is followed by the UART initialization
as the UART will be used to send the data to the PC for analysis. Then each byte of the 4K
bytes of the SRAM is initialized with 0xAA then certain arbitrary locations are initialized
with specific values to detect if there was any address shifting when reading/writing data
from/to SRAM. The reason of using 0xAA for initialization because it’s an alternating
pattern of 0’s and 1’s and would help in detecting bit sets and resets if there’s any. After
the system, UART and SRAM initialization, the laser is triggered just before the target
instruction(s) as demonstrated in Listing 6.2. If the target instruction is manipulated,
the value at the arbitrary location on line 1 in Listing 6.2 should be different from the
expected value indicating a successful LFI. All the 4K bytes are sent to the PC using
UART then stop execution using an infinite loop. If a hardfault is injected, the firmware
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keeps sending the 32 bytes of the stack frame depicted in Figure 6.2 repetitively (code
elaborated in Listing B.3 in Appendix B) until the PC receive 4K bytes. If the DUA
hangs or becomes locked-up (instruction execution stops because of LFI), the PC times
out after 5 seconds instead of waiting indefinitely to receive the 4K bytes. The reason for
the 5 seconds timeout is to be able to automate the experiments at different locations with
different laser parameters (e.g. laser pulse width and amplitude) and operating conditions
(e.g. supply voltage) then conduct the LFI analysis later. The mentioned LFI program
in this subsection was run at each scanned target location and then the DUA was reset
through a master Python script before re-running the program at a different target location
or with different pulse parameters and/or operating conditions.
Listing 6.1: Pseudo-code for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102
1 BL SYS INIT ; System c o n f i g u r a t i o n
2 BL UART INIT ; I n i t i a l i z e UART
3 BL SRAM INIT ; I n i t i a l i z e SRAM
4 BL LASER TRIGGER ; Tr igger l a s e r
5 ADDS R1, #0x01 ; Target i n s t r u c t i o n
6 STRB R1, [R0 ]
7 BL SRAM readout ;UART sends 4K b y t e s to PC
8 STOP BL STOP
Listing 6.2: Code for LFI triggering using ARMv6-M instruction set
1 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion1
2 LDRB R1, [R0 ]
3 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
4 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
5 LDR R3, [R2 ]
6 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
7
8 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
9 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
10 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
11 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
12 ADDS R1, #0x01 ; Target i n s t r u c t i o n repea ted 85 t imes
13 . . .
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14 ADDS R1, #0x01
15 STRB R1, [R0 ]
16 BL SRAM readout ;UART sends 4K b y t e s to PC
17 STOP BL STOP
6.3 Locating Debug Access Port (DAP) circuitry
During the design of the development PCB mentioned in subsection 4.3.1, a debugger was
thought to be a very useful tool in investigating successful LFI. The ARM Cortex-M0
LPC1114FN28102 uses the SWD protocol to communicate with a compatible debugger.
The SWD protocol requires two main signals to operate: data I\O and Clock. For ARM
Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102, those two signals are known as: SWDIO and SWCLK as
shown in Figure 6.7. The debugger ULINK2 was chosen over other debuggers from other
vendors because it provides more insight when used with the Keil® Microcontroller Devel-
opment Kit (MDK). Keil® MDK is the most comprehensive software development solution
for Arm®-based MCUs and includes all components needed to create, build, and debug
embedded applications. SWD protocol is a 2-pin debugging protocol which is better when
compared to 5-pin debugging Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) protocol. SWD proto-
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Figure 6.7: Pin mapping through X-ray scanning of a backside decapsulated ARM Cortex-
M0 LPC1114FN28102 chip. TR1/TR2 are the pins used for triggering channels 1/2 of the
laser source.
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JTAG is a four-pin or five-pin serial protocol that is commonly used for digital component
testing. The interface contains the signals described in Table 13.2.
Although the JTAG interface is commonly used and well supported, using four or five pins
for debug operations is too many for some microcontrollers with low pin counts. As
a result, ARM developed the serial wire debug protocol, which uses only two pins
(Table 13.3).
Although only two signals are required, the serial wire debug protocol can offer better
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Debug interface (DAP) in Cortex-M0.
Table 13.2: Signals connection for the JTAG debug.
JTAG Signal Descriptions
TCK Clock signal
TMS Test Mode Select signaldcontrols the protocol state transition
TDI Test Data Indserial data input
TDO Test Data Outdserial data output
nTRST Test resetdactive low asynchronous reset for a JTAG state control unit called the TAP
controller (The nTRST signal is optional. Without nTRST, the TAP controller can be reset
with five cycles of TMS pulled high.)
224 Chapter 13
Figure 6.8: DAP in ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 [11].
The Debug Access Port (DAP) shown in Figure 6.8 provides up to 4 hardware break-
points and 2 hardware watchpoints. The Breakpoint instruction BKPT could be used for
unlimited number of software breakpoints.
Also, The Cortex-M0 processor has a halt mode, which stops program execution and
allows the debugger to access processor registers and memory space. During halt mode,
the following activities occur:
• Instruction execution stops.
• If the processor was in sleep mode, it wakes up from the sleep mode before halt. Two
sleep modes can be entered by two instructions: WFI, WFE.
• Registers in th processor’s registe bank, as well as special registers, n be accessed
(both read and write).
• Memory and peripheral contents can be accessed (this can be done without halting
the processor).
• You can resume program execution, carry out single-step operation, or reset the
MCU.
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The DAP circuit location in the die was discovered when doing a LFI scan for the upper
right quadrant in Figure 6.3b. The zeros, in the heat map in Figure 6.9 or any subsequent
heat map, refer to positions where no faults were injected in the DUA. A reset behavior
was detected as shown in the heat map in Figure 6.9 at the Not-A-Number (NaN)-labelled
locations. The oscilloscope detected recurring laser pulses and the PC didn’t receive any
bytes that were supposed to be sent by the LFI firmware downloaded on the DUA. Also
no hardfault was reported at that location therefore no bytes were sent by the UART.
To further understand why and when the reset behavior happened at that location, the
debugger was connected to the DUA and the LFI firmware was executed one assembly
instruction at a time. When the laser triggering instruction (STR R3, [R2]) was reached
(11th line in Listing 6.2), the DUA was still functioning as expected. As soon as the
laser triggering instruction was executed, the debugging session was ended as shown in
Figure 6.10. The ending of the debugging session due to the LFI effect is expected because
the DUA was reset by an external factor other than the debugger itself. The debugger
can be used to legitimately reset the DUA if desired during a debugging session without
being kicked out of the debugging mode. The reset behaviour in the DAP area was 100%
repeatable even after moving the laser back to the origin before re-doing the experiment.
However some locations might not be detected as shown in Figure C.1 in Appendix C when
the XY-stage resolution is changed due to the high spatial sensitivity of LFI to inject faults
successfully and also due to the XY-stage position reproducibility. Also note that the 50X
was used in Figure C.1 in Appendix C compared to the 5X in Figure 6.9. A possible cause
of the reset behavior that leads to the recurring pulses is that the debugger, which can be
used to legitimately request a reset through the DAP circuitry, is probably replaced by an
illegitimate reset request induced by the LFI. Th effect of different utilized percentages of
the peak current is illustrated in Appendix C in Figures C.7-C.11 where the sensitive spot









































































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nan 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nan nan nan 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 nan nan nan 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UR_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, PDM CH2 is enabled, 5X
182 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 7
 # of hanging locations: 7
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 0
Target area between: (26624,24576) and (53248,49152), step:2048(82.0um)










# of injected faults 
Figure 6.9: DAP location in heat map. 5X objective used at 182 locations scanned in the
upper right quadrant at 3.3V supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns
laser pulse width at 100.0% of peak current with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. The
seven sensitive locations (labelled as NaN) experienced a reset behavior.
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Figure 6.10: Debugger session ended as a result of LFI.
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6.4 Attacking UART
One of the most common peripherals in every MCU is the UART. The UART location
in the chip was discovered when the LFI firmware was modified to target seven different
instructions instead of only targeting the ADDS instruction. Different target instructions
were isolated in the assembly code from each other by inserting a series of NOP instructions
as elaborated in Listing B.1 in Appendix B. The effect of the seven laser pulses injected
in the DUA had an effect similar to the reset effect experienced while locating the DAP
circuit. However, this time it wasn’t a reset because laser pulses weren’t recurring which
was confirmed both visually using the NIR camera during the five seconds of the UART
timeout and also confirmed through the oscilloscope that captures any laser pulses. The
effect of those seven pulses is that the PC didn’t receive any bytes from the UART. A
possible explanation for these results of Listing B.1 in Appendix B is further elaborated in
section 6.4.1.
In order to investigate the effect of the LFI on the UART, the firmware was modi-
fied to target only the ADDS instruction with seven identical consecutive laser pulses as
elaborated in Listing B.2 in Appendix B. The result of such experiment is shown in Fig-
ure 6.11. Instead of causing a hanging effect, only partial hanging occurred where the PC
received 1440 bytes out of the expected 4K bytes but all of the received bytes had the value
0xFF. The NaN-labelled locations are those locations where the partial hanging fault was
experienced. Also the location of the UART RX and TX pins show in Figure 6.7 are in
the neighborhood of the discovered location for the UART circuitry shown in Figure 6.15.
Out of the 14 sensitive locations, seven locations (labelled as NaN) experienced a partial
hanging fault, where only 1440 bytes were sent by the UART as 0xFF (these results may
indicate a possible location for the transmission register U0THR). The remaining seven
locations experienced shifting faults, where likely data was read from the wrong addresses.
This was probably a bus error due to LFI because the 4K bytes of the SRAM were read
but with some shifting in the order of the bytes. However the observed shifting faults
(throughout this chapter) were not repeatable. This may be explainable due to the cu-
mulative effect of the injected laser pulses at the previous location despite waiting one
second between each location after resetting the DUA through the reset pin controlled via
the master Python script. The annotated numbers in Figure 6.11 indicated the number























































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 35 46 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 39 47 0 0 0 0
0 33 0 0 nan 70 59 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 nan nan nan 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 nan nan 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 nan 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bottom_Right_sweet_spot(~ 56000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: OFF, 5X
165 locations @ 01.80V, 20MHZ, 50ns, 25.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 14
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 7
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 7
Target area between: (43008,1024) and (48128,8192), step:512(20.0um)









# of injected faults 
Figure 6.11: 5X objective used at 182 locations scanned in a specific area in the bottom
right quadrant at 3.3V supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse
width at 100.0% of the peak current with only PDM CH1 enabled.
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6.4.1 Lockup state
The Cortex-M0 processor can enter a lockup state if another fault occurs during the exe-
cution of a hard fault exception handler or when a fault occurs during the execution of an
NMI handler. This is because when these two exception handlers are executing, the pri-
ority level does not allow the hard fault handler to preempt. During the lockup state, the
processor stops executing instructions and asserts a LOCKUP status signal. Depending
on the implementation of the MCU, the LOCKUP status signal can be programmed to
reset the system automatically, rather than waiting for a watchdog timer to time out and
reset the system. The lockup state prevents the failed program from corrupting more data
in the memory or data in the peripherals. During software development, this behavior can
help us debug the problem, as the memory contents might contain vital clues about how
the software failed. A number of conditions can cause lockup in the Cortex-M0 processor
(or ARMv6-M architecture):
• A fault occurred during the execution of the NMI handler.
• A fault occurred during the execution of the hard fault handler (double fault).
• There was an SVC instruction execution inside the NMI handler or the hard fault
handler (insufficient priority).
• A bus error response during reset sequence (e.g. when reading initial stack pointer
value).
• There was a bus fault during the unstacking of the xPSR during the exception return
using the main stack pointer (MSP) for the unstacking.
When the LFI firmware targeted seven instructions separated by a series of NOPs to
isolate any LFI effects as elaborated in Listing B.1 in Appendix B, this led to experiencing
a full hanging where the UART didn’t send any bytes to the PC. This effect is similar to
the Lockup state detailed earlier in this section.
6.5 Resetting without reset
A location in the chip near the reset pin shown in Figure 6.7 was found to be exploitable by
LFI. The effect of this laser injection was to reset the chip as shown in Figure 6.12. The reset
effect was confirmed because instead of injecting only one pulse at each location during
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the scanned target area, the laser beam spot appeared constantly during the 5 seconds
timeout allocated for each location and the LFI firmware didn’t send any of the 4K bytes
to PC through the UART. Besides, the TDS7254 oscilloscope shown in Figure 4.4 was used
to capture the recurring laser pulses resulting from the reset of instruction execution after
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BL_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 5X
182 locations @ 01.80V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 2
 # of hanging locations: 2
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 0
Target area between: (0,0) and (26624,24576), step:2048(82.0um)
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Figure 6.12: 50X objective used at 182 locations scanned in the bottom left quadrant at
3.3V supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100.0%
of peak current with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Only two locations (labelled as
NaN) experienced a reset when the shown resolution was used for scanning.
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6.6 Instruction manipulation
The instruction register location (output of the Flash memory) was guessed at first based
on the backside image of the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 as shown in Figure 6.15
then confirmed by scanning such area and analyzing the scanning results. Figure 6.13
and Figure 6.14 show that most of the induced hardfaults were in the upper part of the
instruction register with the exception of the first fault at the top of Figure 6.13b (marked
inside the red circle). This location is probably a valid bit as the number of uniform
structures in the instruction register is 17 while the opcode is only 16 bits. Since most of
the hardfaults are in the upper part of the instruction register, it’s probably because the
Most Significant Bit (MSB) of the opcode is located at the top of the instruction register
below the valid bit and the Least Significant Bit (LSB) may be located at the bottom of
the instruction register in the bottom left quadrant of the DUA. It’s believed to be a valid
bit because when it is hit by the laser it leads to an instruction skip effect (as if a NOP
was executed). The hardfault was confirmed to be triggered at 16 cycles after the target
instruction by reading out the program counter in the dumped stack frame illustrated in
Figure 6.2.
Successful manipulation of the immediate value in the ‘ADDS R1, #0x01’ instruction
by getting a value of 0xFE instead of 0xFF at the SRAM memory address 0x10000801
was achieved only through targeting the beam at the red-circled location in Figure 6.14b.
This effect was experienced by resetting the 1-bit in the immediate value in the ‘ADDS
R1, #0x01’ instruction (12th line in Listing 6.2), likely creating a faulty instruction ‘ADDS
R1, #0x00’. Other locations which had only one fault in Figure 6.13a was also a faulty
value at the SRAM address 0x10000801 probably due to changing either the immediate
value or the source/destination register used in the ‘ADDS R1, #0x01’ instruction to
another register other than R1. Locations with more than one faulty value in Figure 6.13a
were shifting faults. When the blue-marked location in Figure 6.14b (probably part of the
address decoding circuit or the register file) was targeted under the same settings, the faulty
value at the same SRAM memory address 0x10000801 was 0xCC instead of 0xFF. The
reproducibility of the instruction manipulation attack was affected by the repeatability of
the XY-stage movement accuracy affecting laser positioning and the chosen scan resolution
as shown in Figure 6.13a compared to Figure C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C. Note that a
higher scan resolution was used in Figure C.2. Also in Appendix C, Figures C.4, C.5
and C.6 depict the effect of the repeatability of the XY-stage on the successful LFI at a
single fine line scan of the output of the Flash memory area annotated in Figure 6.15.
Note that the dashed shapes in Figure 6.15 indicate rough locations of LFI but details
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UL_scan(~ 1069200.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 50X
1258 locations(37x34)@ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 34
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 34
Target area between: (0,25000) and (27000,49750), step:750(30.0um)
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Figure 6.13: a) Heatmap and b) scatter plot for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28 upper
left quadrant scan using 50X objective at 1258 locations at 3.3V supply voltage and DUA
running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100.0% of the peak current with both
PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. 10 out of shown 34 sensitive locations produced hardfaults,
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BL_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 50X
728 locations(28x26)@ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 4
 # of hanging locations: 2
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 2
Target area between: (0,0) and (27000,25000), step:1000(40.0um)
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Figure 6.14: a) Heatmap and b) scatter plot for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28 bottom
left quadrant scan using 50X objective at 728 locations at 3.3V supply voltage and DUA
running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100.0% of the peak current with both
PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Out of the four sensitive locations two triggered chip reset

















Figure 6.15: Annotated probable structures in ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Solid
circles indicate pins while dashed circles indicate rough LFI areas. The UART pins
(RX,TX), Reset pin (RST) and SWD debugger IO pin (SWDIO) marked in Figure 6.15
could be mapped to the X-ray image in Figure 6.7.
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6.7 PEM
In Figure 6.16 we could capture some PEM emissions using the setup described in sub-
section 4.3.2 but most of them are in the peripherals and we could not capture the emissions
at the instruction register even with over-voltaging and single instruction execution.The
instruction register emissions are probably blocked due to the thickness of the substrate
and some substrate thinning might be required to capture those emissions with the SWIR
camera. The thinning was not performed due to limitations of the used desktop CNC
machine in the vertical direction (i.e. Z-axis could move in increments of ∼ 13µm only).
The emissions shown in Figure 6.16 were acquired with core/IO supply voltage equal to
3.6V and offered a starting point for exploitable target areas and proved to be in close
proximity to the probable identified structures in Figure 6.15. While several ARM Cortex-
M0/M4 based MCUs were investigated in [131] and an ARM Cortex-M3 based MCU was
attacked in [132], both [131,132] didn’t provide a PEM image where different structures of
the DUAs could be identified through RE.
It might be worth mentioning that over-voltaging (up to 4V) didn’t provide noticeable
improvements regarding the captured emissions. On the other hand, under-voltaging (down
to 1.65V) was expected to make the DUA more susceptible to LFI but it wasn’t the actual
case.
Supply OFF Supply ON
Supply OFF Supply ON
Supply OFF Supply ON
Figure 6.16: Captured PEM emissions in ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Most of
them are in the peripherals.
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6.8 Countermeasures
Building on the discussion in section 5.5, the hardfault ISR was already implemented in
ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. However, no latch-up effects were encountered in the
ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 using the laser setup mentioned in sub-section 4.3.1.
The hardfault hardware countermeasures which detect LFI could still be considered to be
an effective but expensive countermeasure against LFI.
To counteract the reset attack presented in section 6.5, several locations over the chip
could be used as trusted reset bit registers to differentiate between a legitimate reset request
versus a LFI induced reset. Besides, on-chip LEDs could be implemented physically in the
proximity of the debugging and UART circuitry to detect laser pulse(s) and shutdown
the DUA as a countermeasure against the LFI attacks presented in sections 6.3 and 6.4
respectively.
6.9 Summary and comparison with previous research
During our various attacks on the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102, we didn’t expe-
rience any Single Event Latch-ups (SELs) reported in [131] probably since the used Al-
phaNov PDM+ laser module used in our setup (maximum 3W for an adjustable laser
pulse width between 5ns-500ns) was not as powerful as the laser used in [131] (1.2µJ
maximum laser energy for a fixed laser pulse width of 800ps). However, we were able
to cause Single Event Transients (SETs) through targeting the output of the instruction
register in ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Also we were not able to cause SEUs in
the SRAM of ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 which was also reported by [131] totally
for STM32F051R8T6 from ST Microelectronics and partially for LPC11E14FBD64 from
NXP which are also both ARM-Cortex M0 based MCUs.
With both PDM channels enabled for a 200ns pulse through the 5X objective, the
current percentage had to be above 65% in order to be able to inject faults. The objective
also determines the spot size thus the power intensity. Based on our empirical results, from
section 6.3 till section 6.6, it appears that given the best x-y-z position, it is the power
intensity of the laser pulse that matters (both laser pulse width per unit area and laser
pulse amplitude per unit area) as the most important metric to look for successful LFI.
Usually in consumer end products, manufacturers disable access to the debugging cir-
cuitry as a security measure. Therefore locating the debugging circuitry as described in
section 6.3 could be an alarm for manufacturers to secure the debugging circuitry itself
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rather than just blocking access to the pins. In addition, if the attack mentioned in sec-
tion 6.3 is conducted during an online circuit debugging session, it would trigger false fail-
ures which could be detrimental to the debugging process. The UART attack mentioned
in section 6.4 could be used to fault desired bytes communicated by the DUA through
the UART interface. For an example, it would be dangerous if the UART is attacked
while sending critical medical information to hospitals. Also the reset attack mentioned
in section 6.5 could be used to reset health devices as well as reset the counter for wrong
Personal Identification Number (PIN) entries (e.g password guessing reset attack) when
there’s no access to the DUA’s reset pin. The next chapter provides a brief summary as
well as discussion of contributions and future work.
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Chapter 7
Discussions, Conclusions and Future
Work
This chapter will provide a brief summary of the research results. A discussion of the
research limitations and contributions is also presented. Future work including a discussion
of countermeasures is also presented.
7.1 Summary
In conclusion, the details of a LFI methodology are provided using both 5X and 50X
objectives, quiescent PEM with SWIR camera (no over-voltaging), pulse timing (a glass
slide plus APD) and imaging using 3D printed IR-LED ringlet. The laser thermal effect
might be playing a small if not negligible part in creating the fault since the laser is pulsed
and the thermal laser stimulation is typically done using a wavelength above 1300nm [133].
In one DUA, specifically the 450nm PIC16F687, only the 5X objective was required
to precisely inject faults. Injecting the laser pulse at different locations along the Flash
outputs (possible instruction register) provided direct instruction fault injection control
and insertions. Additionally the single tuned laser pulse injection was shown to skip an
arbitrary number of assembly instructions thus defeating assembly instruction replication
countermeasures such as duplication, triplication, etc. The number of skipped instructions
depended on several parameters such as the type of instruction, laser peak current, laser
pulse width, frequency of the DUA, and location of the laser on the DUA.
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For the other DUA, specifically the 140nm ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102, both
the 5X and 50X objectives were needed to be able to inject faults depending on the tar-
get area. Photon emissions were only captured at certain areas in the chip with no PEM
emissions captured at the Flash memory output probably due to the increased substrate
thickness for this more advanced technology node [125]. Despite having an automated LFI
setup with a magnetic fixture for the DUA’s custom-designed development PCB, equip-
ment limitations such the repeatability of the motorized XY-stage affected the instruction
manipulation experiment in section 6.6. However, target areas like the DAP and UART
circuitry illustrated in section 6.3 and 6.4 respectively revealed new vulnerabilities for
possible attack scenarios.
7.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are listed below:
• Sample preparation details for backside LFI using a relatively low cost CNC machine.
Also sample preparation from the frontside was performed using low cost manual
chemical etching unlike most previous research using very expensive equipment [68,
134–136] to prepare LFI-ready samples.
• Performed successful LFI analysis on two DUAs with different technology nodes,
processor cores and design complexity. Most previous research utilized devices from
consecutive technology nodes such as 90nm and 45nm in [102] or custom-made chips
with full knowledge about the implementation and target areas such as in [127]. Also,
in [131] the technology node was reported to be unknown for NXP LPC11E00 which
is a very similar chip the NXP ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 investigated in
this thesis.
• Analysis of dynamic LFI and quiescent photon emissions on an embedded processor
aided by backside imaging to RE different structures on the decapsulated chip unlike
previous research which only did laser analysis [127,132] or only did PEM [6].
• Demonstrated a practical methodology to monitor the laser pulse during fault injec-
tion (using a microscope slide), including empirical analysis of the laser’s pulse effect
on the DUA using a field probe, data analysis and PEM. This is unlike previous
research which analyzed pulse characteristics separate from experiments [137].
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• Quiescent PEM with a 10X objective demonstrates that targeting different locations
in the instruction register using the correct laser pulse energy (width and amplitude)
for each location will result in controlled faults being injected into instructions. This
is unlike previous research which utilized active (i.e. non-quiescent) PEM with no
focus on instructions [122].
• Instruction-replacement fault injection supports new attacks such as adding one more
round to AES-128 (11th round) through skipping the check for the 10th round, unlike
previous research which largely focuses on attacks where instructions are skipped
[115,121] or bits are flipped in control registers using static faults [130].
• Ability to alter the immediate value of an instruction read from the Flash mem-
ory, unlike previous research which demonstrated entire instruction change [124] or
attacks on flip-flops [90,128] or SRAM [29,48,129].
• Reverse engineering the exact timing of the target clock cycle (Q3fetch) with quiescent
PEM to determine when the laser should be effective for successful fault injection,
unlike previous research [121].
• Robust automated LFI setup with magnetic fixture for DUA’s custom developed
PCB, scripted re-programming of the DUA for automated experiments and automatic
active laser pulse capturing on the controlling PC through the oscilloscope and the
APD detector/microscope slide unlike commercial LFI solutions [54].
• Analyzing the locations of inserted hardfaults which naturally support fault identi-
fication, thus acting as a countermeasure, unlike previous research [131] that only
considered hardfaults as chip malfunction.
• Focusing on debug/UART circuitry as vulnerable areas for LFI attacks that were
not previously discussed in the literature, thus attacking data sent off of chip and
revealing new research vulnerabilities. This is unlike previous research which only
reported latchups [131] or processor crashes [138] and didn’t try to identify such
LFI-sensitive areas.
7.3 Limitations and Future Work
Largely limitations are due to the available laboratory equipment. For example, the pre-
cision and repeatability provided by the used motorized XY-stage could be improved by
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using a higher-end motorized XYZ-stage, thus increasing the efficiency of the LFI which
has high spatial dependency. Also, limited knowledge of the attacked processors, since
they were not open source, was another aspect that limited the attacks through increasing
the time needed to figure out sensitive areas of the DUA susceptible to LFI. Should the
attacker have access to all the information of a chip (e.g. known layout structure, etc.),
it is likely that an automated LFI attack using our setup could be performed in a matter
of seconds; however we didn’t have access to such a chip. While not having access to our
own custom-designed chips was time-consuming to discover sensitive locations in a DUA,
this lead to an understanding of obstacles for a real device attack thus fostering ideas on
how to make it more difficult for the attacker. Analysing the data-sheets for the DUAs
to understand the architecture, as well as interfacing and automating the hardware for
equipment synchronization took a substantial amount of work. One key to improving the
current LFI system would be to additionally automate the fault analysis process as well.
Also one of the most important laser-independent parameters which should be reported is
likely the energy in the laser spot per unit area on the DUA’s surface. Unfortunately in
this research we had no access to equipment to measure this parameter hence parameters
were reported relative to inputs of the commercial laser system at hand.
Beside these equipment limitations, the LFI attack from the backside has a main limi-
tation with respect to technology scaling even for a very highly equipped security lab. The
beam spot size is limited by the wavelength of the laser beam, so ∼ 1µm is the small-
est beam spot size for the 1064nm laser beam. The effect of the relatively large beam
spot size on LFI for chips manufactured with different technology nodes was analyzed
in [4, 90, 102, 127] starting from 350nm down to 90nm, 45nm and 28nm where LFI still
proves to be an effective and precise method to inject faults. It’s unknown how the LFI
will perform when attacking more advanced devices such as those manufactured using a
14nm process. Also, Fully Depleted Silicon on Insulator (FD-SOI) showed less sensitivity
to LFI [4] and thus should be further explored for security dedicated circuits implementa-
tions. The shallow trench isolation (STI) and buried oxide (box) used in FD-SOI structures
are made of an insulator. The FD-SOI structures channel is completely insulated from the
substrate conversely to the bulk structure. Moreover, for the FD-SOI structure, the chan-
nel is made of intrinsic silicon. In a FD-SOI transistor, only two currents can be induced
by the laser and those two currents are independent. The first current, which goes from
source to drain, impacts the data path. The second current, which goes from N-well to
substrate, changes the electric potential of the N-well. This change can alter the tran-
sistor function (e.g. threshold voltage). The threshold voltage modification modifies the
transistors switching delay. This phenomenon may cause faults due to timing constraint
violation in the circuits logical data path. Conversely, in a bulk structure without STI
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a laser beam generates many currents, which interact with each other. Thus there is a
competition between all these currents. The result of this competition depends on exper-
imental parameters such as the spot size and the lasers distance from the transistor [4].
Also, the SOI fin field-effect transistors (FinFETs) collected 270 times less charge than
bulk FinFETs [139]. In terms of scalability, it’s extremely unlikely that SOI FinFETs will
replace MOSFETs for lower end devices because the MOSFETs are easy and cheap to
produce. But at the high end, FinFETs are winning and Intel is already using them at
their 22nm process node [140]. Therefore, SOI FinFETs may be more suitable for high
end secure chips.
Without these limitations and given perfect equipment, LFI can be tailored to change
code on the fly, control higher privileged functions like resets, modifying data sent off chip
and changing addresses of the data being read out. Countermeasures will still remain
difficult to design since lasers are dependent upon the specific location on the die. There-
fore, the implementation of countermeasures remain challenging to thwart security attacks
for important secure embedded systems. Integrity checks on instructions, authenticated-
encrypted data sent off chip, and possibly other on-chip security-related data will be needed
as countermeasures against successful LFI.
Future work would include focus on the following items in addition to further counter-
measure development:
• Investigation of the effect of VMU objectives with higher magnification power on
the beam spot size and successful LFI. Using 100X and 200X NIR objectives should
result in 2µm and 1µm beam spot sizes respectively. A smaller beam spot size mean
both higher precision and power intensity which proved to be very crucial in having
successful LFI for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102.
• Using surface mount DUAs instead of through-hole as most MCU vendors offer up-
to-date MCU in surface mount devices. Designing a PCB with a hole on the backside
of the soldered DUA for different ARM Cortex-based MCUs should have very small
variations since the ARM Cortex family have very similar interfaces.
• The increasing thickness’s of modern chips [125] makes the PEM analysis almost im-
practical without any substrate thinning. Therefore innovating a low cost technique
for thinning the substrate of up-to-date DUAs would be specially beneficial to the
PEM research and embedded security field in general.
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[37] F. Träger, Springer Handbook of Lasers and Optics. Springer, 2007. [Online].
Available: https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-0-387-30420-5
[38] K. Kitamura, K. Sakai, and S. Noda, “Sub-wavelength focal spot with long
depth of focus generated by radially polarized, narrow-width annular beam,”
Opt.Express, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 4518–4525, Mar 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://www.opticsexpress.org/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-18-5-4518
[39] C. E. Webb and J. D. C. Jones, Handbook of laser technology and applications. CRC
Press, 2004.
[40] K. Rottwitt and P. Tidemand-Lichtenberg, Nonlinear Optics: Principles and Appli-
cations. CRC Press, 2014, vol. 3.
[41] M. S. Brown and C. B. Arnold, Fundamentals of Laser-Material Interaction and
Application to Multiscale Surface Modification, ser. Laser Precision Microfabrication.
118
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 91–120. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10523-4 4
[42] A. R. Shayan, H. B. Poyraz, and J. Patten, “Laser absorption percent for si and
sic,” 6/7/2017 2008. [Online]. Available: http://wmich.edu/mfe/mrc/pdf/Amir%
20and%20Bogac Laser%20Absorption%20for%20Si%20and%20SiC 10-24-2008.pdf
[43] A. Y. Nikiforov and P. K. Skorobogatov, “Physical principles of laser simulation for
the transient radiation response of semiconductor structures, active circuit elements,
and circuits: A linear model,” Russian Microelectronics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 68–79,
2004. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:RUMI.0000018711.96346.1d
[44] G. Canivet, P. Maistri, R. Leveugle, J. Clédière, F. Valette, and M. Renaudin, “Glitch
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This Appendix includes the main features and test measurements for the AlphaNov PDM+
laser module used for LFI throughout this thesis. The total peak power that can be
outputted by both laser channels is around 3.1W with channel 1 providing around 1.5W
and channel 2 providing 1.6W. To get the maximum combined power output, both channels’
trigger signals have to be synchronized. Figures A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 depict different
laser parameters and measurements for both laser channels as provided by AlphaNov [12].
(a) (b)
Figure A.1: Channel one (CH1) a) parameters and b) peak power [12].
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(a) (b)
Figure A.2: Channel one (CH1) peak power (100kHz/100ns) versus a) software current
and b) analog voltage (BNC input) [12].
(a) (b)
Figure A.3: Channel two (CH2) a) parameters and b) peak power [12].
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(a) (b)
Figure A.4: Channel two (CH2) peak power (100kHz/100ns) versus a) software current




This Appendix include selected parts of the source code used in the LFI experiments
conducted on the ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102 in chapter 6. In all code listings
below, the text after the “;” symbol is a comment and the “...” denote that the instruction
is repeated a number of times as noted in the comment.
Listing B.1: Different target instructions for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102
1 ; Target ing 1 s t LDR i n s t r u c t i o n
2 ; Laser t r i g g e r
3 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
4 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
5 LDR R3, [R2 ]
6 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
7 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
8 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
9 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
10 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
11 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
12 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion4 ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
13 LDR R1, =0xBB
14 STRB R1 , [R0 ]
15 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
16 . . .
17 NOP
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18 ; Target ing 2nd LDR i n s t r u c t i o n
19 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion4
20 ; Laser t r i g g e r
21 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
22 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
23 LDR R3, [R2 ]
24 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
25 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
26 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
27 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
28 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
29 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
30 LDR R1, =0xBB ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
31 STRB R1 , [R0 ]
32 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
33 . . .
34 NOP
35 ; Target ing MOVS i n s t r u c t i o n
36 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion4
37 ; Laser t r i g g e r
38 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
39 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
40 LDR R3, [R2 ]
41 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
42 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
43 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
44 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
45 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
46 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
47 MOVS R1, #0xBB ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
48 STRB R1 , [R0 ]
49 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
50 . . .
51 NOP
52 ; Target ing LDR in R1 inSTRuction and STM i n s t r u c t i o n
53 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion7
54 ; Laser t r i g g e r
55 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
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56 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
57 LDR R3, [R2 ]
58 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
59 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
60 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
61 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
62 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
63 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
64 LDR R1, =DUMMYDATAWORD1 ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
65 LDR R5, =DUMMYDATAWORD2
66 LDR R6, =DUMMYDATAWORD3
67 LDR R7, =DUMMYDATAWORD4
68 STM R0! ,{R1,R5−R7}
69 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
70 . . .
71 NOP
72 ; Target ing LDM i n s t r u c t i o n
73 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion7
74 LDR R1, =DUMMYDATAWORD1
75 LDR R5, =DUMMYDATAWORD2
76 LDR R6, =DUMMYDATAWORD3
77 LDR R7, =DUMMYDATAWORD4
78 STM R0! ,{R1,R5−R7}
79 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion7
80 ; Laser t r i g g e r
81 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
82 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
83 LDR R3, [R2 ]
84 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
85 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
86 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
87 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
88 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
89 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
90 LDM R0! ,{R1,R5−R7} ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
91 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
92 . . .
93 NOP
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94 ; Target ing STM i n s t r u c t i o n
95 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion7
96 LDR R1, =DUMMYDATAWORD1
97 LDR R5, =DUMMYDATAWORD2
98 LDR R6, =DUMMYDATAWORD3
99 LDR R7, =DUMMYDATAWORD4
100 ; Laser t r i g g e r
101 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
102 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
103 LDR R3, [R2 ]
104 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
105 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
106 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
107 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
108 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
109 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
110 STM R0! ,{R1,R5−R7} ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n
111 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
112 . . .
113 NOP
114 ; Target ing ADDS i n s t r u c t i o n
115 LDR R0, =SRAM arbitrary locat ion1
116 LDRB R1, [R0 ]
117 ; Laser t r i g g e r
118 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
119 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
120 LDR R3, [R2 ]
121 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
122 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
123 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
124 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
125 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
126 ; End o f Laser t r i g g e r
127 ADDS R1,#0x1 ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n repea ted 85 t imes
128 . . .
129 ADDS R1,#0x1
130 STRB R1 , [R0 ]
131 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
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132 . . .
133 NOP
134 BL SRAM readout ;UART sends 4K b y t e s to PC
135 STOP BL STOP
Listing B.2: Seven consecutive pulses for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102
1 ; Tr igger PDM l a s e r CH1 and CH2 us ing PIO 7 and PIO 9
2 LDR R2, =GPIO0DATA
3 LDR R3, [R2 ]
4 LDR R4, =((1<<PIO 7 ) :OR:(1<<PIO 9 ) )
5 BICS R3, R3, R4 ; Reset PIO 7 and PIO 9
6 STR R3, [R2 ] ;
7 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Set PIO 7 and PIO 9
8 STR R3, [R2 ] ; PIO 7 and PIO 9 are t o g g l e d ( h igh )
9 ; ; ; ; ; A d d i t i o n a l 6 l a s e r p u l s e s
10 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
11 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
12 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
13 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
14 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
15 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
16 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
17 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
18 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
19 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
20 EORS R3, R3, R4 ; Value to t o g g l e
21 STR R3 , [R2 ] ; Toggle ( h igh )
22 ADDS R1,#0x1 ; t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n repea ted 85 t imes
23 . . .
24 ADDS R1,#0x1
25 STRB R1 , [R0 ]
26 NOP ; r epea ted 20 t imes to i s o l a t e t a r g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s
27 . . .
28 NOP
29 BL SRAM readout ;UART sends 4K b y t e s to PC
30 STOP BL STOP
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Listing B.3: Stack frame dumping for ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102
1 HardFault Handler Loop
2 MRS R0, MSP ; s t a c k i n g was done us ing MSP
3 ; R0 as the s t a r t address o f the s t a c k frame
4 ; Read out STACK FRAME and keep sending to UART
5 LDR R1, =U0THR ; Address o f the t ransmiss ion r e g i s t e r
6 LDR R2, =U0LSR ; R e g i s t e r c o n t a i n i n g THRE
7 MOVS R3, #(1<<U0LSR THRE) ; R3=0x20 (1<<U0LSR THRE)
8 MOVS R5, R0
9 ADDS R5, #StackFrame Size ; 8 r e g i s t e r s each i s 4 b y t e s
10 ; R0 = SP+0x00 t i l l SP+0x1F + 0x1
11 NEXT STACK BYTE
12 ; S t a r t t ransmis s ion by p u t t i n g the d e s i r e d data in r e g i s t e r
13 LDRB R4, [R0 ] ; Data to be t r a n s m i t t e d in U0THR r e g i s t e r
14 STRB R4, [R1 ] ; [U0THR]=R4=[R0]=[SP+0x00 ]
15 ; Wait t i l l t ransmiss ion i s complete to avoid o v e r w r i t e
16 LDR R4, [R2 ] ; R4 = [U0LSR]
17 TST R4, R3 ; THRE = 0 so U0THR conta ins v a l i d d a t a .
18 ; THRE = 1 so U0THR i s empty.
19 BEQ s t i l l t r a n s m i t t i n g s t a c k
20 ADDS R0,R0,#0x1
21 CMP R0,R5
22 BNE NEXT STACK BYTE




This Appendix includes several experiments for LFI on ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102.
The experiments mentioned in this Appendix are discussed and compared to other exper-
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UR_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 50X
210 locations(15x14)@ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 2
 # of hanging locations: 2
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 0
Target area between: (26000,24000) and (54000,50000), step:2000(80.0um)










# of injected faults 
Figure C.1: DAP location in heat map. 50X objective used at 210 locations scanned in
the upper right quadrant at 3.3V supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns
laser pulse width at 100.0% of peak current with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Only
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UL_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 50X
1258 locations(37x34)@ 01.65V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 34
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 34
Target area between: (0,24750) and (27000,49500), step:750(30.0um)
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Figure C.2: 50X objective used at 1258 locations scanned in the upper left quadrant at
1.65V supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100.0%
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UL_scan(~ 1100000.0 m2), Movement pattern: BULR, CH1: ON, CH2: ON, 50X
182 locations @ 01.80V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 2
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 2
Target area between: (0,24576) and (26624,49152), step:2048(82.0um)










# of injected faults 
Figure C.3: 50X objective used at 182 locations scanned at upper left quadrant at 1.8V
supply voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100% of peak
current with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Only a hardfault at the top and a single





































































flash_output_scan(~ 0.0 mm2), Movement pattern: BULR, PDM CH2 is enabled
30 locations @ 01.60V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 2
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 2
Target area between: (17408,16384) and (17408,46080), step:1024(0.04096mm)







# of injected faults 
Figure C.4: 50X objective used at 30 locations scanned at Flash output at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100% of peak current
with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Both faults were instruction manipulation faults





































































flash_output_scan(~ 0.0 mm2), Movement pattern: BULR, PDM CH2 is enabled
30 locations @ 01.60V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 2
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 2
Target area between: (17408,16384) and (17408,46080), step:1024(0.04096mm)







# of injected faults 
Figure C.5: 50X objective used at 30 locations scanned at Flash output at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100% of peak current
with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. Both faults were instruction manipulation faults





































































flash_output_scan(~ 0.0 mm2), Movement pattern: BULR, PDM CH2 is enabled
30 locations @ 01.60V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 1
 # of hanging locations: 0
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of (shifting/hardfaults/etc) locations: 1
Target area between: (17408,16384) and (17408,46080), step:1024(0.04096mm)







# of injected faults 
Figure C.6: 50X objective used at 30 locations scanned at Flash output at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100% of peak current
with both PDM CH1 and CH2 enabled. The fault was an instruction manipulation fault
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144 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 12.5% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 32
 # of hanging locations: 32
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of faulted locations: 0
Target area between: (40960,39936) and (46592,45568)(1.64mm,1.6mm) and (1.88mm,1.84mm), step:512(0.02048mm)
7.7 minutes











# of injected faults 
Figure C.7: 5X objective used at 144 locations scanned in the DAP area at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 12.5% of peak











































0 0 0 0 0 nan nan nan 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan 0 0 0
0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan nan 0 0
0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan nan 0 0
0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan 0
0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan nan nan 0
0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan nan 0 0
0 0 0 0 nan nan nan nan nan nan 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 nan nan nan nan 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
144 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 25.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 55
 # of hanging locations: 55
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of faulted locations: 0
Target area between: (40960,39936) and (46592,45568)(1.64mm,1.6mm) and (1.88mm,1.84mm), step:512(0.02048mm)
9.4 minutes











# of injected faults 
Figure C.8: 5X objective used at 144 locations scanned in the DAP area at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 25% of peak current
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144 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 50.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 127
 # of hanging locations: 127
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of faulted locations: 0
Target area between: (40960,39936) and (46592,45568)(1.64mm,1.6mm) and (1.88mm,1.84mm), step:512(0.02048mm)
20.0 minutes











# of injected faults 
Figure C.9: 5X objective used at 144 locations scanned in the DAP area at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 50% of peak current
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
144 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 75.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 203
 # of hanging locations: 203
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of faulted locations: 0
Target area between: (40960,39936) and (46592,45568)(1.64mm,1.6mm) and (1.88mm,1.84mm), step:512(0.02048mm)
30.8 minutes











# of injected faults 
Figure C.10: 5X objective used at 144 locations scanned in the DAP area at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 75% of peak current
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144 locations @ 03.30V, 20MHZ, 200ns, 100.0% out of 4000mA, Delay=0ns
 # of sensitive locations: 283
 # of hanging locations: 283
 # of partial hanging locations: 0
 # of faulted locations: 0
Target area between: (40960,39936) and (46592,45568)(1.64mm,1.6mm) and (1.88mm,1.84mm), step:512(0.02048mm)
44.6 minutes











# of injected faults 
Figure C.11: 5X objective used at 144 locations scanned in the DAP area at 3.3V supply
voltage and DUA running at 20MHZ and a 200ns laser pulse width at 100% of peak current
with only PDM CH1 enabled.
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